

Theme

Peace and Security: Responsibility for BRICS for Global Stability, New Threats and Challenges and Opportunities for BRICS

Title

BRICS at seven: Finding and funding the nexus between Peace, Security and Development in Africa

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ABSTRACT

BRICS at seven years old is well into institutionalising itself, and has gone beyond building its legitimacy and credibility. With that, attendant debates on what BRICS is, is not, and what it should be have to give way to a functionalist stream of discourse: on what BRICS is practically capable of doing. This paper then seeks to unleash this strand of discourse, by identifying and exploring niche areas within the cluster of peace and security challenges, and how these can be linked to their fundability as sustainable development projects in Africa.

Setting out its mandate, BRICS' New Development Bank wants to mobilise resources for sustainable development projects in BRICS and in other emerging economies, in co-ordination with "...the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development."¹ Against this background, it is crucial to translate 'soft' peace and security challenges into sustainable development opportunities. This is so, for their character is inherently 'developmental'. This is the crux of the paper's theme.

This paper then seeks to explore the practicality of identifying the fundability of such peace and security challenges in Africa, within a myriad of an interdependent network of regional economic organisations; multilateral institutions; governments; and international non-government organisations; and against the south-south cooperation thematic setting. The paper will highlight particular case studies of peace and security challenges in Africa, the level and depth of South Africa's involvement in them, and how BRICS' New Development Bank and other interested and affected institutional entities can deepen the nexus between peace, security and development. This exercise will highlight how these peace and security challenges link up the BRICS constellation of countries and other emerging economies of the global South, further

¹ **Agreement on the New Development Bank**, 15 July 2014, Fortaleza, Brazil.

proving how these ‘developmental’ peace and security challenges embed interdependence among BRICS countries, the global South, and the world.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to discern how BRICS can practically link peace and security with sustainable development. BRICS was formed out of a vexation that the challenges of the global South are not well-reflected and well-addressed in world institutional systems often biased to the interests of the global North. Its formation then is meant to concentrate thinking on development in a manner unencumbered by the fallibilities of a biased world framework. This thinking is aimed at translating peace and security challenges into development opportunities, thus exploring potential ways in which this nexus could be found, and funded, producing well-coordinated and measurable development outcomes.

The paper first appraises the maturity of BRICS as an institution at seven years old. It examines BRICS at a conceptual level, as it views itself within a multipolar political and financial world system, through the declarations of its summits. This is done partly to clarify BRICS’ stance, whether it is reformist or radical, in the midst of the dynamics of the reconfiguration of the world systems’ institutions.

The narrative in the paper continues then to tracking the mandate of BRICS on peace and security, through its summit declarations, particularly on locating the link between peace, security and development. Consequent to that, it settles on making distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ peace and security challenges, and the wisdom of advising BRICS countries on these against the background of competing national and foreign policy and regional economic communities’ interests, who consider these challenges their prerogatives to address.

The main thrust of the paper follows, suggesting practical measures of linking peace, security with development, as an outcome, against the canvas of multiplied actors in a multipolar world system. It does so through illustration, with hypothetical case studies, of how BRICS countries, collectively through the New Development Bank, can work on actualising this link.

2. BRICS AT SEVEN

2.1. What is BRICS at Seven?

Recalling how BRICS, as a concept, came to be is a hackneyed story, laboured to death, and yet does not say what BRICS is, particularly at seven years old. The story portrays BRICS as a renegade within the political and financial world system, striving to offset the *status quo* and bring forth a ghettoised global South-dominated world system. Literature on BRICS is replete

with this narrative. What BRICS, and many other multilateral arrangements renounce is the unworkability of the unipolar international relations system. Between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the unipolar world system witnessed ten large-scale military interventions, one every fifteen months.² Hence President Vladimir Putin's assertion that, "The myth about the uni-polar world fell apart once and for all in Iraq."³

In the midst of all this narrative, BRICS is reformist, perhaps radical-reformist, as a consequence of the economic might it amassed in proportion to the weakening of the global North countries. BRICS does not want to rock the boat, but, as it were, to steer it in the right direction. In all the BRICS Summits' declarations (Sanya, 2011; New Delhi, 2012; eThekweni, 2013; and Fortaleza, 2014), BRICS espouses the interdependence and the remedying of the world system, and not its revamping. In the Sanya Declaration (2011), BRICS maintained that:

7. We share the view that the world is undergoing far-reaching, complex and profound changes, marked by the strengthening of multipolarity, economic globalization and increasing interdependence.⁴

In the New Delhi Declaration (2012), BRICS positioned itself thus:

4. We envision a future marked by global peace, economic and social progress and enlightened scientific temper. We stand ready to work with others, developed and developing countries together, on the basis of universally recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision making, to deal with the challenges and opportunities before the world today.⁵

In the eThekweni Declaration (2013), BRICS noted thus:

1. The Fifth BRICS Summit concluded the first cycle of BRICS Summits and we reaffirmed our commitment to the promotion of international law, multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations (UN). Our discussions reflected our growing intra-BRICS solidarity as well as our shared goal to contribute positively to global peace, stability, development and cooperation. We also considered our role in the international system as based on an inclusive approach of shared solidarity and cooperation towards all nations and peoples.⁶

The Fortaleza Declaration (2014) further affirmed that:

² Dilip, H. (2009) **After Empire: The Birth of a Multipolar World**, (Nation Books, New York).

³ *Ibid.*, (pp. 271 – 81).

⁴ Sanya Declaration (2011), BRICS III Summit, *Broad Vision, Shared Prosperity*.

⁵ New Delhi Declaration (2012) BRICS IV Summit, *Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity*.

⁶ eThekweni Declaration (2013) BRICS V Summit, *BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation*.

2. Our shared views and commitment to international law and to multilateralism, with the United Nations at its center and foundation, are widely recognized and constitute a major contribution to global peace, economic stability, social inclusion, equality, sustainable development and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries.⁷

BRICS therefore champions the consolidation of a multipolar world based on the principles of interdependence, mutual prosperity, and universally shared values.

Statistics on the development dynamics of BRICS countries may portray a constellation of countries poised to counter-balance the US and Western Europe's political and economic might in the world system. China will have surpassed the US by 2017 as the world's largest economy. India has already surpassed Japan as the world's third largest economy. BRICS, representing almost three billion people or 40 per cent of the world's population; has a combined nominal GDP of US\$16.04 trillion in combined foreign reserves.⁸ Rather, what this should portray of BRICS at seven is its "...capacity to conduct sovereign public policies"⁹ due to the ascendancy of raw materials prices and their huge demand in international markets. During this period, China amassed US\$ 1.95 trillion in foreign reserves by the end of 2008.¹⁰ BRICS at seven years old, therefore, carries this potential to steer its developmental policies in the face of the seemingly intractable will of the global North to reform world institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in favour of the developmental and governance needs of the global South. The Sanya, New Delhi, eThekweni and Fortaleza declarations all reaffirm their disappointment and serious concern with the "...non-implementation of the 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms, which negatively impacts on the IMF's legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness."¹¹ All in all:

What emerging powers pursue collectively is to seek a new international political and economic order that is built on the principles of multi-polarity, justice, fairness and democracy. As newly influential members of the current international system, emergent powers wish to increase their voice in the global governance structure to reflect their perspectives and interests. They are working together to make global governance structures more representative and effective through peaceful and gradual reforms. In this context, the BRICS group is not aimed as a counterbalance to the established western powers but rather seeks to pursue a

⁷ Fortaleza Declaration (2014) BRICS VI Summit, *Inclusive Growth: Sustainable Solutions*.

⁸ William, S. (2014) **BRICS As A Counter-Balance to US and Europe**, (Washington, D.C. Forum, 08 October 2014, Round Table Discussion). See also, Ochkina, A. (2013) **BRICS As A Spectre of Alliance**, in, Bond, P. (ed.) **BRICS in Africa: Anti-Imperialist, Sub-Imperialist or In Between?: A Reader for the Durban Summit**, (CCS, UKZN; groundwork; South Durban Community Environmental Alliance; with Pambazuka News).

⁹ Tautz, C. (2013) **Watchdogging the BRICS Bank**, (p. 53), in, Bond, P. (ed.) **BRICS in Africa**.

¹⁰ Zhongping, F. (ed.) (2009) **China's New Security Perceptions and Practice**, (pp. 31 – 48), in, Peral, L. (ed.) **Global Security in a Multipolar World**, (Chaillot Paper no. 118), (Institute for Security Studies, Brussels).

¹¹ Fortaleza Declaration (2014), (Paragraph 18).

more effective or equal interaction with them to build a better world order for humanity.¹²

BRICS, at seven years old, is therefore a reality beyond a platform for dialogue, with real potential might to steer a new direction through the intractabilities in the current multipolar international relations system. It is a new formation steadily institutionalising itself into a formidable entity in the world system. Having legitimised its existence and built its credibility in the last six years, it is now settling its institutional planks to exploring ways of translating its shared, common goal, development¹³, into a reality.

Already, BRICS has made strides in actualising development. The BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism; the BRICS Multilateral Infrastructure Co-Financing Agreement; the Co-Financing Agreement for Sustainable Development, and the Cooperation Agreement on Innovation, have been signed. Also, the Sanya Declaration made provision for dialogue with other countries outside the BRICS group on development. There, the first Retreat with African Leaders was convened on 15 July 2014, on the margins of the BRICS Sixth Summit, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, invited leaders from South American countries¹⁴ to meet with BRICS Leaders. At the summit, the BRICS Trade Ministers highlighted the developmental potential in forging links between micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) of the BRICS, and instructed their officials to explore ways to promote cooperation, through sharing information on the MSME regulatory framework; promoting business to business contacts, and identifying appropriate institutional framework for MSME cooperation. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on BRICS Export Credit and Guarantees – to improve the support environment for increasing trade opportunities – and also recognizing potential for BRICS insurance and reinsurance market to pool capacities.¹⁵

Further on deepening the actualisation of development, there is a need for a move in the debates on BRICS towards a functionalist stream of discourse, from a mere normative discourse. It is important to make sense of how the momentum of the institutionalisation of BRICS, particularly on peace and security challenges, translates to development in practical ways. As Fatima Shabodien pointed out, “It is not enough for Brics to say it wants to create an alternative to this framework. We need to start hearing what this alternative vision and commitment looks like in real terms.”¹⁶

¹² Haibin, H. (2012) **BRICS in Global Governance: A Progressive Force?**, (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Dialogue on Globalization), (p. 6).

¹³ Chen, D. (2014) **3 Reasons the BRICS’ New Development Bank Matter**.

¹⁴ The South American countries invited were: Argentina; Bolivia; Chile; Columbia; Equator; Guyana; Paraguay; Peru; Suriname; Uruguay and Venezuela.

¹⁵ **BRICS New Development Bank’s Africa Regional Centre in South Africa: Impact and Outlook** (2014), (My ANC; www.anc.org.za).

¹⁶ Shabodien, F. (2013) **Brics as Radical Shift – or a Mere Relocation of Power**, (p. 13), in, Bond, P. (ed) **BRICS in Africa**.

2.2. BRICS at Seven: Tracking the Mandate on Peace and Security

In actualising development on the front of peace and security challenges, BRICS has, from its inception, realised the unavoidable linkages between peace, security and development. In the Sanya Declaration (2011), BRICS coalesced on the point that:

3. It is the overarching objective and strong shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that brought together BRICS countries with a total population of nearly 3 billion from different countries. BRICS aims at contributing significantly to the development of humanity and establishing a more equitable and fair world.¹⁷

In the New Delhi Declaration (2012), BRICS continued in the same vein of connecting peace, security and development challenges:

2. BRICS is a platform for dialogue and cooperation amongst countries that represent 43% of the world's population, for the promotion of peace, security and development in a multi-polar, inter-dependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world.¹⁸

In the eThekweni Declaration (2013), BRICS committed itself to:

22. ... building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity and reaffirm that the 21st century should be marked by peace, security, development, and cooperation. It is the overarching objective and strong shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that brought together BRICS countries.¹⁹

In the Fortaleza Declaration (2014), BRICS maintained that:

4. Since its inception, BRICS have been guided by the overarching objectives of peace, security, development and cooperation... In this sense, we are ready to explore new areas towards a comprehensive cooperation and a closer economic partnership to facilitate market inter-linkages, financial integration, infrastructure connectivity as well as people-to-people contact.²⁰

The mandate of finding a nexus between peace, security and development is palpable in BRICS' mandate. However, the challenge is searching for practical ways of linking peace and security with development, and identifying practical means of bringing out development objectives and output of this nexus.

¹⁷ Sanya Declaration (2011).

¹⁸ New Delhi Declaration (2012).

¹⁹ eThekweni Declaration (2013)

²⁰ Fortaleza Declaration (2014).

2.3. Facing Reality: Advising BRICS on Peace and Security Challenges

BRICS, reaching consensus on a platform of common foreign policy ethos of non-interference, respect for each other's sovereignty, mutual respect; have coalesced on working on the following peace and security concerns throughout the summits:

- Drugs and narcotics;
- Terrorism;
- Multilateral diplomacy in the UN;
- MDGs / post-2015 MDGs;
- Transnational organised crime;
- Piracy / peacebuilding in piracy-affected communities;
- ICT and cybercrime;
- Poverty eradication in post-conflict societies; and
- Corruption.

The first challenge in addressing these peace and security challenges, and in finding the nexus with development, is that there are no particular vehicles or measures which have been worked out to deliver these objectives. More worrying is that there are no specific outputs measurable which have been agreed to. The second challenge is the realisation that the BRICS Academic Forum has to embrace, that many of these concerns are the prerogatives of the BRICS countries, their foreign policies and national institutions that address these through bilateral and multilateral initiatives, and regional economic communities. Taking into consideration sensitive national interest issues, and that all BRICS countries are regional political and economic powerhouses with experiences and mandates of peacemaking and peacebuilding in their regions, many of these peace and security challenges will remain the prerogatives of national and regional bodies of BRICS countries. It is therefore important for BRICS institutions such as the Academic Forum to sober up to this reality, and henceforth identify or find 'soft' peace and security challenges, particularly within the realm of peacebuilding, that BRICS could fund and generate practical links with development out of them.

3. BRICS, SOUTH AFRICA AND PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA

3.1. South Africa: BRICS' Link to Africa in Peacebuilding

South Africa is the link to, and the presence of Africa in the BRICS, and to the world through BRICS. South Africa consolidates and brings to bear BRICS' interests in peace, security and development through its foreign policy ethos, its positions as a gateway and link to Africa, its African Agenda, its experience and interests in peacemaking and peacebuilding in Southern Africa and in the rest of the continent. South Africa's rich experiences, credibility and legitimacy in addressing peace and security challenges in Africa are established in multilateral diplomatic experiences and reach with the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC); other regional economic communities in Africa, the UN Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Resolution in Africa, and with international NGOs.

South Africa's foreign policy is the first and real link between actualising peace and security challenges with development through BRICS. It had been crafted against the background and ethos of South-South cooperation, particularly taking the development of the African continent as the launch pad *raison d'être*. South-South cooperation is one of the key proponents driving South Africa's relations with countries in the global South. This is clearly expressed in South Africa's White Paper on Foreign Policy, *Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu*.²¹ *Ubuntu* is a Nguni word in Southern Africa, which literally translates to 'humanity.' Its meaning is underpinned by the importance of the unity of peoples, and how actions of one person or entity of people positively affect the other person or group of people. The concept of *ubuntu* manifests in the idea that "...we affirm our humanity when we affirm the humanity of others."²² This philosophical idea occupies the centre of South Africa's national consciousness, and in forging democratic transformation and nation-building. Through this philosophical tenet, South Africa places great importance in strengthening its relations with countries in the Southern African region and the rest of the continent. It uses it as a natural rationale for fostering relations with countries in the global South to address to trade and underdevelopment challenges, and working towards the betterment of multilateralism. In promoting multilateralism, South Africa has taken leading roles in various multilateral for a, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), G77 + China, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations (UN).

Further reflecting the position of South Africa's foreign policy on multilateralism, the White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy maintains that:

²¹ See, **Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu**, (White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy, Final Draft, 2011, 13 May), (<http://www.info.gov.za/DownloadFileAction?id=149749>).

²² *Ibid*, (p. 4).

Reflecting national interest, South Africa's foreign policy recognises that states are interdependent, and promotes cooperation over competition and collaboration over confrontation. In this context [South Africa] is committed to development partnerships around the world. It draws on the spirit of internationalism, pan-Africanism, South-South solidarity; the rejection of colonialism and other forms of oppression; the quest for the unity and economic, political and social renewal of Africa; the promotion of poverty alleviation around the world; and opposition to the structural inequality and abuse of power in the global system.²³

Renu Modi explained the genesis of South-South cooperation as stretching back to the immediate post-World War II period, when the developing countries of Africa and faced a system of international relations, and an international trade regime that exploited their resources. As a result, these newly emerging independent African and Asian countries "...shared common historical experiences and faced similar politico-economic challenges."²⁴ These then provide the broader context of South Africa's embrace of South-South cooperation, and the key motivation behind such cooperation.

With all these rich experiences that South Africa brings to bear in BRICS, "...it takes from its past involvement in Africa. Considering its past experience with peacekeeping and PCRD activities, the matter of maintaining coherence, strategic planning and sustainability will probably be the most vital aspect in ensuring success while working with IBSA or, perhaps in future, BRICS."²⁵

3.2. BRICS' New Development Bank: Funding the Nexus between Peace, Security and Development

The value of South-South trade now exceeds North-South trade by US\$2.2 trillion, with over one-quarter of global trade. BRICS' New Development Bank (NDB) comes in significantly at this juncture, as the World Bank estimates that US\$1 trillion is required in funding the 'infrastructure development gap' in developing countries, and existing multilateral development banks are able to fill approximately 40 per cent of this infrastructure development gap.²⁶ So, as the New Development Bank develops, with more countries joining, after a couple of decades, NDB bank loans could 'dwarf World Bank loans', as in CAF, which now funds more development projects in Latin America than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined.²⁷

²³ *Ibid*, (pp. 10 – 11).

²⁴ Modi, R. (ed) (2011) **South-South Cooperation: Africa on the Centre Stage**, (Palgrave MacMillan, London), (p. 1).

²⁵ Chen, D. (2014) **3 Reasons the BRICS' New Development Bank Matters**.

²⁶ Desai, R.M. & Vreeland, J.R. (2014) **What the New Bank of BRICS is About**.

²⁷ *Ibid*.

The NDB's purpose and function is to "...mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, complementing the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development."²⁸ The Agreement on the NDB further maintains that the Bank (NDB), in fulfilling this mandate, shall support public or private projects through loans, guarantees, equity participation and their financial instruments, and shall cooperate with international organisations and other financial institutions in providing technical assistance for projects supported by the Bank.

In this context, BRICS' NDB, in potentially funding peacebuilding activities in Africa, in particular, enters into a realm of aid and donor activity in an interdependent multipolar world, with governments; multilateral institutions; international NGOs and regional economic communities, all playing increasingly significant and complex roles. The emergence of the NDB and the exploration of BRICS' role playing in this realm therefore has generated 'a new politics of aid and donor activity'²⁹ in this multipolar world context, not defined by the liberal, global North-dominated architecture.

As it were:

Most donors are very concerned about Western interventionism and the biases of the liberal peace system, and are interested in bringing their own diverse experiences to the international peacebuilding architecture. Nevertheless, they have found themselves having to work within that system for their own advantage, to influence or reform it, while also perhaps trying to hold it at arm's length.³⁰

Rendering the more multipolar world more complex and, perhaps, dynamic, is the changing face and might of the UN system in addressing 'soft' peace and security challenges, and the entry into this orbit of unfamiliar agents. The UN concedes to that it no longer has the capacity to address conflict management, mainly affecting developing, particularly in the area of international organised crime. To that effect, there is a need for cross-sectoral engagement on conflict management and resolution, and on consolidation relations with the AU Peace and Security Council, and the UN Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Resolution in Africa. This then provides the NDB, South Africa and the BRICS an engagement-strengthening mandate in finding the nexus between peace, security and development.

Within this multipolar world realm, there is also the emergence of the so-called 'Washington Bubble', which in essence is the US Government's 'military drivedown, an urge for frameworks

²⁸ **Agreement on the New Development Bank**, (2014, July 15), (Fortaleza, Brazil).

²⁹ Richmond, O. & Tellidis, I. (2013) **The BRICS and International Peacebuilding and Statebuilding**, (NOREF, Oslo), (p. 2).

³⁰ *Ibid*, (p. 4).

conceptualising civil-military relations in peacebuilding activities in developing countries tied to US foreign policy interests.

Another unfamiliar agent in the realm of peacebuilding activities in developing countries is the private sector, and more significantly private armies and private intelligence agencies. It is an undisputed fact that the private sector, particularly transnational companies, wield vested political interests in developing countries, tied with their financial fortunes. The financial and economic interests of these companies is proportionate to their political connections and power in developing countries. To that effect, their interests and concerns in peace and security developments in developing countries are inextricably linked to their survival and prosperity in the developing countries they have invested in.

Also, the European Union (EU) has recognised the need for strategic partnership and involvement with BRICS, in the wake of its weakened economy. The EU points out how the current economic EU economic crisis has demonstrated the interdependence between the developed countries, the BRICS and other emerging economies. There is, therefore, positivity in the nature of such interdependence. It realises the importance of the deep, mutual link between the stable economic growth of developed and developing countries. To that effect, there is a need for dialogue between the EU and the BRICS, in the spirit of partnership, and with an overall aim of achieving an inclusive new system of governance. The EU therefore stresses the need for continued high-level meetings between the EU and BRICS countries, which would provide a valuable opportunity to build relations of trust, and reconciling positions and encouraging BRICS countries to assume greater responsibility in a new system of global governance.³¹

The EU:

Believes that relations between, on the one hand, the established powers and, on the other, the BRICS and other emerging powers maintain a relevant economic dimension, but are essentially political and should thus be politically framed, as all the countries concerned share an interest in ensuring an effective system of global governance and in tackling together, in a spirit of cooperation and consultation, and convergence of policy stances, those global stability and security risks which may pose a threat to sustainable global economic growth and its potential for the future; [EU] calls therefore, for enhanced cooperation between the EU and the BRICS, including in terms of partnerships with individual BRICS countries, on all matters of international concern.³²

In all this, the national interests, mandates and experiences of the BRICS countries cannot be discounted. China targets infrastructure development in the hope of gaining access to contracts and resources, particularly in Africa, although respectful of sovereignty and non-interference. India and Brazil are racing for a UNSC seat and elevating their international status. They have

³¹ **Report on the EU Foreign Policy Towards the BRICS and other Emerging Powers: Objectives and Strategies**, (2012), (EU Committee on Foreign Affairs).

³² *Ibid*, (Paragraph 2).

their own experiences of poverty and poverty eradication, inequality and development strategies to offer. Russia is interested in elevating its international status in the wake of a multipolar world system and the fall of the US and Western Europe-dominated unipolar system. South Africa brings an interest in discrimination, racism, human rights development, and carries on its back SADC and Africa’s development interests, mandates and concerns.³³

The following table / matrix attempts to elicit ideas on beginning to find workable niche areas on ‘soft’ peace and security challenges in Africa that BRICS, the New Development Bank and South Africa could generate into fundable projects, taking into consideration various affected and interested agents and stakeholders in the multipolar world system that all operate in. These are suggestions, generated from hypothetical case studies.

Table: Finding and Funding the Nexus Between Peace, Security and Development

Countries Identified	Grade: Conflict / Post-Conflict	Issues Identified	BRICS Countries Affected / Interested	Stakeholders Affected / Interested	NDB Mechanisms to be Used	Timeframe
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Grade 2: Post-Conflict, but unstable, with regional effects	- DDR in Eastern DRC -Resettlement of refugees in Eastern DRC - Education and advocacy on land tenure systems; land rights; agricultural production; and exploration of potential for agribusiness / bio-energy production in Eastern DRC.	- Brazil (South-South Cooperation on agricultural / bio-energy production. - South Africa (Youth & Women education and mobilisation) - India (Exploration of ICT development and employment creation potential,	- South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), working with the development agencies of Brazil and India, co-ordinating targeted international NGOs	- Guarantees to SADPA	- 5 years, renewable, with review and monitoring

³³ Ibid.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Youth mobilisation or entrepreneurship activities in Eastern DRC -Women mobilisation for entrepreneurship activities 	particularly targeting youth)			
South Sudan	Grade 1: Conflict, but relatively stable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Resettlement of IDPs - Training of civil servants - Alignment of civil service - Training of civil servants and mid and senior political officials on reconciliation - Mobilisation, education and training of youth & women on entrepreneurship and life skills - Review and analysis of primary health care services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - South Africa (Training of civil servants; alignment of civil service; training of mid to senior political officials on reconciliation; mobilisation of youth and women on entrepreneurship and life skills). -India & China (Resettlement of IDPs). - Brazil (Review and analysis of health care services) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -South Africa, SADPA - India & China, development agencies co-ordinating on resettlement of IDPs - Brazil, working through its development agency on health services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Guarantees to SADPA. - Guarantees to Brazilian development agency - Guarantees to Indian and Chinese development agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To be determined, as South Africa and various NGOs are already engaged in various development projects in South Sudan
Somalia	Grade 1: Conflict, but relatively stable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Demarcation of local government - Training on local government institutional set- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ South Africa, SADPA; Indian development agency (Demarcation of local 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SADPA & Indian development agency. - Russian and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Guarantees to SADPA. - Guarantees to Russian and Chinese 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To be determined

		up - Training on setting up of municipal services and infrastructure-related programmes	government; Training on local government institutional set-up), co-ordinating work through development agencies. - Russia & China (Training on setting up of municipal services and infrastructure-related programmes)	Chinese development agencies	development agencies.	
Angola	<u>Grade 3</u> : Post-Conflict, stable	-Agribusiness / bio-energy production for MSME -Provision of health care services in rural areas	- Brazil & Russia (Agribusiness / bio-energy production for MSME. - Brazil & India (Provision of health care services in rural areas)	- Brazilian, Russian and Indian development agencies	- Guarantees to Brazilian and Indian development agencies	- To be determined due to high and unco-ordinated traffic of work, with little information documented

Source: Author

4. CONCLUSION

The area of linking of peace, security with development in developing countries is well-charted, and has generated its own intricate and dynamic politics since the Cold War. It is the well too familiar realm of donors, development agencies, the private sector’s corporate social responsibility, and philanthropy. It is an area often regarded as trailing behind, and serving the national interests of donor countries. BRICS and the New Development Bank is enters into this orbit with multiplied actors since the end of the Cold War.

Main challenges facing this area are two-fold. The first one is one that many donor activities are linked with the national and foreign policy interests of donor countries. The second challenge is that the donor activities, often left to be undertaken by international NGOs and other non-state actors, are often uncoordinated, with outputs difficult to identify and measure. As many of these activities are left to the NGOs and other non-state actors, they are often viewed as ends in themselves, with little review and monitoring meant to link these projects to the bigger ideals and goals of donor countries. To that effect, particularly in the exercise of linking sustainably peace and security with development, leaves the root causes of conflict inadequately attended to. This then carries the potential of a relapse into conflict, and wasteful expenditure.

The main challenge for the BRICS countries to find ways to co-ordinate their activities out of their collective interest of development, and finding sustainable links between peace, security and development. The table above attempts, as far as possible, to align specific development projects with the known experiences and expertise of individual BRICS countries. It is also to concede to the role and expertise of international NGOs and other non-state actors, mainly as a result of their experiences and expertise in conceptualising, conducting, monitoring and reviewing to the details such development projects.

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