THE CASE FOR SOUTHERN COOPERATION ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

APRM – African Peer Review Mechanism
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU – African Union
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOSOC – United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
F2F – Fragile to Fragile
IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development
P&D – Peace and Development
REC – Regional Economic Community
SAIIA – South African Institute of International Affairs
SDG – Sustainable Development Goal
SSC – South-South Cooperation
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

THE CASE FOR

UN Photo by Staton Winter. Family in Clay Ashland, Liberia.
As we approach the Second High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation (BAPA+40), South-South Cooperation (SSC) faces a much different political world than that of its first meeting in 1978. While there was no mention of peace in that first plan of action, the United Nations 2030 Agenda, approved in 2015, makes peace and development intrinsically connected. Moreover, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) place a premium in a global partnership for development and reinforces the role of SSC in that partnership. With estimates that by 2030—the same deadline set to achieve the SDGs—over half of the world’s population will be living in countries affected by high levels of violence, with the majority in the Global South, there is a window of opportunity for Southern countries to advance an agenda for peace and development (P&D). Most importantly, as we take note of the positive contributions of SSC in past decades, this document shows that SSC on P&D is already taking place and that there is much to be known about these initiatives, especially if Southern countries are to make use of this political momentum.

This document takes two steps and makes two general, related arguments: we mobilize existing cases of SSC on P&D and suggest this valuable knowledge needs to be systematized and made accessible, so that SSC can be better equipped to address the P&D challenges that are now at the center of the international political agenda. In addition, this document scrutinizes the notions of peace, sustaining peace, P&D and the positions of some Southern countries and organizations relative to these notions and SDG16 on peaceful, just and inclusive societies. With that, we generally identify an opportunity and a risk: the document suggests not only SSC can contribute to P&D but, more importantly, that SSC may do so in its own way. SSC on P&D has been influenced by SSC principles and values, which are importantly connected to more holistic approaches to P&D. Therefore, not addressing the role of SSC on P&D risks that not only might SSC fail to occupy the important role it can occupy in the global partnership for the SDGs and, consequently, for P&D, but it might also lose momentum by not facing the challenge that is becoming central to the current international agenda.

We consider SSC initiatives on P&D and SSC values and principles and how they connect to specific views on peace, P&D and SDG16 to make specific recommendations for BAPA+40. We recommend first and foremost that SSC actors turn their attention in decisive ways to P&D – because this is already being done to some extent with considerable positive results; most Southern actors have stated their desire to take part in engaging with P&D initiatives; and there is a window of opportunity for doing it and doing it well. We also specifically recommend that the understanding of results not be restricted to traditional views on effectiveness but be open to coherence, which invokes principles, values and commitments already present in the field. In addition, we recommend that SSC M&E systems rely equally on qualitative and quantitative analysis, and that SSC bodies study the potential for further cross-regional cooperation. Finally, the document recommends Southern countries clearly express their commitment to sustaining peace and SDG16, even if that means offering caveats, because a cohesive discourse can lead to more coherent cooperation and strengthen SSC as a block in terms of cooperation modalities. This means that Southern countries should leverage this momentum to discuss international responsibilities over P&D, that is, the responsibilities of actors beyond national borders, which means social justice on a global scale. It also means Southern countries in SSC should not shy away from discussing politics and geopolitics, as history has shown that an apparent avoidance in the recent past has cost important opportunities to further Southern countries’ interests. More importantly, because P&D is highly political, reducing it to technical issues would mean replicating business-as-usual.
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I especially want to thank my colleagues in the Global South Thinkers on Peace and Development and thank UNOSSC for their support in bringing that community into existence and setting up our first meeting in Antigua, Guatemala, in October 2018. That was an incredible opportunity for inclusive dialogue. Our group is diverse and yet, as with SSC, shares the experience of dealing with some key challenges to peace and development in our countries. In our Global South Thinkers on Peace and Development group, I thank Amanda Lucey, Oxfam and Network of Southern Think Tanks, South Africa; Alejandro Galarza, ILLAIP, Ecuador; Javier Brolo, Pablo Hurtado, Jorge Sanabria, Ana Lucia Blas, ASIES, Guatemala; Petra Albutz, Espacio Público, Chile; Shagufa Ahmad, MENAPAR, Bahrain; and Cecilia Milesi, UNOSSC; who all provided great inspiration in Guatemala when we first discussed several of the ideas in this document. We all learned much in that encounter; I thank you all for sharing, talking and actively listening. Without your insights these ideas could not have taken form. I again thank Amanda Lucey, Shagufa Ahmad, Javier Brolo, Cecilia Milesi, in addition to Lucía Dammert from Espacio Público, for valuable comments on the first draft. And I especially thank my colleagues Manuela Trindade Viana, Maira Siman and Paula Drumond (senior researchers, BRICS Policy Center) for their support and comments at all stages, and Camila Santos (junior researcher, BRICS Policy Center) for her invaluable research support.

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As we approach the Second High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation (BAPA+40), a conference marking the 40th anniversary of the 1978 adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (BAPA), we must take stock of the past and potential contributions of South-South Cooperation (SSC) if we are to leverage its achievements and momentum.

The intersection between peace and development presents a key gap in terms of both knowledge production and the kind of political incentive that comes with evidence. There is no systematized reporting in this area, and even though SSC on peace and development (P&D) is taking place, there has not been a major Southern push to organize knowledge and political engagement around the theme. Countries like Colombia, Brazil, Turkey, Timor-Leste and South Africa have been knowingly cooperating with other countries in the South on several issues. These include: transitional justice, the procedures of truth commissions, peace mediation, peacekeeping and elections support, while also addressing the root causes of conflict and mobilizing capacity in key areas, such as the training of judges, educating youth for peace, strengthening local leadership, establishing communitarian land initiatives, fostering transparent knowledge exchange on extractive industries, building capacity and raising human rights awareness among security forces. Based on existing SSC initiatives to promote P&D, SSC successes in other areas, and the changing context of a field that is leaning towards a more holistic view of peace, SSC offers important contributions for P&D. And with BAPA+40 approaching, there is now a window of opportunity to promote it. This is a step towards providing evidence and support for this promotion.

In this context, the paper seeks to map out conceptual challenges related to SSC on P&D, help compose a Southern narrative for this engagement, explore the connections between SSC principles and current discussions on peace using a theoretical approach and raise awareness through regional and cross-regional analyses.

It is expected this Southern narrative and conceptual framework for SSC on P&D shall benefit member states’ actions in that area, as well as knowledge production, practices and general engagement from

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1 See https://www.unsouthsouth.org/bapa40/.

non-state actors both in the South and in the North. The analysis based on examples of SSC on P&D will hopefully further the knowledge-sharing purpose of SSC by offering accessible demonstrations of these practices. It has the potential to benefit policy decision making and the structuring of M&E systems, in addition to offering insights to academics, civil society, the private sector and other non-state actors. Moreover, these contributions aim to feed into the knowledge-sharing initiatives in preparation for BAPA+40.

This effort is the result of the work initiated by the recently established Global South Thinkers on Peace and Development community of practice (or group) with the support of UNOSSC. The group composition is diverse in terms of nationality and expertise. A recent meeting in Guatemala provided much of the conceptual groundwork and common objectives advanced in this paper. The “we” used throughout the document aims to reflect the fact that this document is not the product of one mind but based on the collective engagement set forth with the group, as independent thinkers.

In the following pages, we first offer a brief contextualization of the state of affairs in the development policy world, going through BAPA and the 2030 Agenda, and highlighting key turning points in SSC. Second, we explore Southern views on SSC on P&D, looking at how peace and P&D have figured in Southern narratives of cooperation. Based on UNOSSC terminology, “South-South cooperation is a broad framework of collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains, involving two or more developing countries.” Third, the paper moves on to a conceptual discussion that encompasses the notions of sustaining peace—peace as a goal and a process (more below)—and SDG 16 on peaceful, just and inclusive societies. This is central to an analysis of the different positions regarding these themes in the South.

We base our analysis mostly on Southern documents and authors to establish our understanding of peace and P&D. In addition to exploring the notions of peace as expressed in SDG16 and in sustaining peace, we share a common background and inspiration in the way peace and P&D are defined by the Global South Thinkers on Peace and Development group:

If peace is the acceptance of a shared future, then development is the path one takes to achieve that shared future. And if peace is premised on the fulfillment of needs, then development is demonstrated in how well those needs are met.

Part of our purpose here is to explore conceptually and concretely the many paths taken in the South to get to some common and distinct understandings of peace and P&D.

Therefore, lastly, we relate the elements of P&D to the principles expressed in SSC. The final parts of the paper mobilize cases of SSC on P&D to understand successes and failures, deriving lessons from regional and cross-regional analyses, highlighting opportunities and risks, and concluding with recommendations for SSC on P&D to potentially contribute to debates in the context of BAPA+40.

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2 See https://www.unsouthsouth.org/about/about-sstc/.
3 Peace and Development Global South Thinkers. First Join Analysis Workshop Report, based on the First Community of Practice Face-to-Face Collaborative Meeting, held in Antigua, Guatemala, on 5–6 October 2018.
SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION AND BAPA+40

The road to Peace and Development

The world of 1978, when the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) was established, has greatly changed. Today, the 2030 Agenda reflects these changes: the challenges posed to development, from poverty and climate change to conflict and crime, are multidimensional and interconnected, requiring multi-stakeholder approaches that are capable of relating the diverse global goals in more holistic ways. The interconnectedness of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can be observed both in the transversal character of certain themes and the inclusion of new, overarching ones. We can say peace, for instance, is not only transversally addressed in the agenda by being touched upon in terms of social vulnerability and social protection systems (SDG1), inclusion and non-discrimination (SDG10), gender equality (SDG5) and other themes, but it is also a goal itself with SDG16 on peaceful and inclusive societies. This is the first time peace is formally included in the United Nations development agenda. Equally relevant, the 2030 Agenda invokes a “revitalized Global Partnership” that requires cooperation among state and non-state actors, the private sector, civil society, the United Nations system and other actors. The issue of partnership(s) crosses all goals and is also represented by SDG17, which outlines the agenda’s implementation and acknowledges SSC as a key modality. A recent document on the SDGs states that “South-South cooperation is poised to play an ever-increasing role in sustainable development”. Yet, by 2030, the same deadline set to achieve the SDGs, it is expected over half of the world’s population will be living in countries affected by high levels of violence, with the majority in the Global South.

With the SDGs motto to “leave no one behind”, the realities of the intersection between peace and development, therefore, become a priority in that Global Partnership and SSC on P&D take central stage.

In the past four decades, SSC has grown in scale and volume, becoming an important force in global development. From 2006 to 2017, it is estimated that SSC flows grew from $8.6 billion to $19 billion. And from 2015 to 2017 alone, the proportion of developing countries providing development cooperation increased from 63 to 74 per cent. Just to name a few varied examples, in the past decade the countries of Latin America have participated in the implementation of 1,475 South-South and 159 triangular cooperation initiatives, with 101 regional SSC initiatives in 2015 and the engagement of Latin American countries in at least 378 SSC initiatives with other regions of the world. Similarly, nearly all Arab States have engaged in SSC, benefiting from over 110 bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives since 2005. In Africa, “nearly all sub-Saharan African countries have experience in SSC/TIC”, benefitting from more than 780 projects between 2005 and 2015. In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), through its Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) work plans, has involved countries in Southeast Asia in more than 500 projects since 2000; several of these are examples of SSC in areas such as health and training programs, especially targeting Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. In this global context, SSC has documented successes in technical capacity-building in areas ranging from nutrition and hunger to agriculture, health, education and culture initiatives. These projects are regional and cross-regional, and benefit from the commonality of certain experiences in the South. Based on principles like non-intervention, demand-driven action, horizontality and solidarity, the volume of finance is less significant than the actual sharing of certain core values and the exchange of experiences and knowledge.

There are key challenges, however: there is still no consensual definition of SSC, an important challenge for BAPA+40; there are also controversies in both political and operational terms as to how SSC principles can be assessed, whether results should be monetized, and in terms of what kind and what level of institutionalization are desired for SSC. Underlying all this is the well-known issue with monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Since no central institution has the authority to coordinate and homogenize processes for reporting SSC flows (like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for traditional cooperation), there is a general lack of systematized reporting on results, especially, on P&D. For our purposes here, it is, thus, important to analyze first how SSC has historically engaged with the theme of peace and how, in the context of SSC, the relationship between peace and development has been understood.

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Peace and Development in the Global South

The BAPA document produced 40 years ago does not mention peace even once. Yet, the history of SSC is characterized by a concern for peace. It could not have been different, seeing that SSC was born amid the tensions of the Cold War with the Southern attempt to gain peace through cooperation, peaceful resolution of conflicts and non-alignment. With the launch of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the establishment of the G77 in 1964, however, a major premium was also placed on economic inequality and the rules of international trade. SSC, as proposed in the 1978 BAPA document, was centered around economic and technical cooperation, and it has so far apparently kept its rather technical and economic character—at least in the formality of common documents—while addressing security issues more indirectly. The Nairobi Outcome Document, adopted at the High-Level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation in 2009, for instance, does not mention “peace”; its focus is on “sustained economic growth and sustainable development” (although it mentions “collective self-reliance” and “ownership”, which will later be central to discussions on P&D). Meanwhile, regional economic communities (RECs) and other regional organizations have been somewhat more explicit about the need to engage with security issues and to address the intersection between P&D; in fact, in many cases, these organizations have given teeth and claws to what has often only been expressed indirectly in SSC documents so far.

RECs and other regional organizations often have a P&D architecture, that is, organs and mechanisms that together target development and security issues. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is a key example; its activities range from early warning to so-called post-conflict reconstruction. ASEAN’s Vision 2020, in turn, advances an agenda for “peace, progress and prosperity”, and the organization has recently established its Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (IPR). As will be shown, several of these activities take place among Southern countries and advance SSC principles.

The reality is that SSC engagement with P&D has been taking place for a long time, but this type of cooperation is seldom documented or reporting is divided into silos, done separately by security and development actors. Meanwhile, practitioners on the ground have several examples of SSC on P&D in hand. Dispersed research shows that SSC has been central in key moments of tension in the South, and an increasing mobilization towards more contextual and nuanced understandings of peace, as with the concept of sustaining peace (more on this ahead), has meant that several projects for which implementation through SSC is already complete or underway in areas that are key to promoting social cohesion are acknowledged as vital contributions for peace. It is crucial that knowledge production in the areas of SSC on P&D follows progress that is taking place in practice, and that this knowledge be systematized and disseminated.
...it is increasingly recognised that peacebuilding and peacekeeping are interrelated and peacekeeping mandates now often incorporate aspects of peacebuilding. In other words, the activities of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are no longer seen in a linear manner. Thus, peacebuilding does not necessarily only occur in “post-conflict” situations but also during and even before a situation breaks out into violence. It has been argued that implementing post-conflict reconstruction efforts only when minimum security conditions are met ignores the inherent connections between different phases of creating peace.26

Peacekeeping missions often include development aspects, and for a long while now development organizations have created new departments or areas and changed operational policies to be able to act in conflict-affected situations.27 The United Nations Peacebuilding architecture itself has been undergoing considerable reform: the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) will join together now under a Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), while the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) will merge.28 The idea, based on a review by experts, is that “peacebuilding actually can and should occur during all phases of the cycle of armed conflict—before, during, and after—and that peacebuilding should be framed as part of the toolbox of preventive measures at the UN’s disposal.”29 Also telling, in 2018, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has been invited to take part in opening the Annual Meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission together with the PBSO.

The complexification of peace and development has been primarily due to the active engagement of the South. Southern initiatives, like the strong lobbying by the g7+ for the New Deal for Engagement with Fragile States,30 the creation and strengthening of regional organizations and mechanisms, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Peer Review Mechanism, and, therefore, the increasing role played by SSC in general, have been central to the changes in P&D. In the recent moves towards co-creating SDG16+ there have been at least two main fronts in the South, around SDG16 and the notion of “sustaining peace.”

25 General Assembly Resolution 70/262, p.2.
31 The World Bank, for instance, created the Fragility, Conflict and Violence area widely based on its well-known 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development. For over 10 years now, it has also counted on OP 8.00 and OP 2.30 to act on crises and emergencies. See OP 2.30 and OP 8.00; Lucye, A. (2015); Siqueira, I.R. de (2017).
34 The g7+ is a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development, composed of Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo and Yemen. The g7+ was founded in 2010. See http://g7plus.org/who-we-are/. The New Deal is an agreement between fragile and conflict-affected states, development partners and civil society to improve the current development policy and practice in fragile and conflict-affected states.
In preparation for the final 2030 Agenda, a High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons was established in 2013 to decide on the SDGs. From the start, the group wanted to include governance and security in the agenda. The 2013 report set the following priority: to “build peace and effective, open and accountable institutions for all”, under which heading the text continued with

“Freedom from fear, conflict and violence is the most fundamental human right, and the essential foundation for building peaceful and prosperous societies. At the same time, people in the world over expect their governments to be honest, accountable, and responsive to their needs. We are calling for a fundamental shift—to recognise peace and good governance as core elements of wellbeing, not optional extras”.34

Supported by Northern countries, this perspective was, however, challenged by some countries in the South.36 These positions have subtly changed throughout negotiations for the SDGs, in part and arguably because of the influence exercised by think tanks and non-governmental organizations.37 The African countries initially followed that line but eventually decided, through the Common African Position (CAP), to support the creation of a goal on peace and security.38 For some in the G77, a goal on peace and security would be an intrusion in the development agenda for many important reasons: Brazil, at first, for instance, expressed its discomfort with the fact that development issues are usually discussed among all countries in fora like ECOSOC or the General Assembly itself, while security concerns are the private matter of the five major powers in the Security Council. Furthermore, there was also concern that poverty would be somewhat criminalized.39 Most importantly—

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35 See, for instance, Ribeiro Pereira 2014; Rosenthal 2017; United National General Assembly. A/71/PV.77. Official records of Seventy-first session, 77th plenary meeting. Thursday, 20 April 2017, 10 a.m.
because it seemed a common position—the G77 in general argued peace was both highly contextual and profoundly linked with international responsibilities, which, in turn, are not usually duly taken into account; instead, responsibility for conflict is too often assigned to solely one country. Contextuality points to internal affairs and, thus, to the sensitive nature of certain issues: rule of law, inclusive decision making and public access to information are matters that countries are not often willing to open up to outsiders’ scrutiny (see SDG16 indicators in Annex I).

In general, it is important to say there are concerns over the “securitization” of development and the prioritization of more traditional security activities, such as countering and preventing violent extremism over crucial preventative ones.41

“Global SDG16 and its indicators put human security at the centre by focusing on issues such as whether people feel safe walking home at night, or whether they think decision-making in their countries is inclusive. It represents a rare recognition that the most strategic tools available for addressing conflict and promoting long-term peaceful political transition are in fact peacebuilding, governance and development efforts. This vital agenda is put at risk if governments use it to pursue national and international security agendas. Global action for conflict prevention, peace and development—as set out in the 2030 Agenda and the Sustaining Peace UN resolutions—is urgently needed but requires an international community that is serious about peacebuilding, ready to safeguard a coherent, peace-oriented approach to development and prepared to reject reactive, securitised and poorly thought-through responses to security threats.” 42

Despite opposition and caveats, nevertheless, SDG16 on peaceful, just and inclusive societies was included in the 2030 Agenda. Yet all these calls for awareness are very much alive, in the way, for instance, SSC advances its principles of non-interference and respect for national sovereignty.

In addition to the political debates around P&D in the context of the SDGs, there is also the issue of SDG16 offering a proper set of “solutions” in terms of evidence-based research. Bolaji-Adio has mapped out some studies in which authors argue that the role of political participation in peace, for example, is not based in evidence; that the latter seems more connected with access to certain public goods. Apparently, non-participatory governments, the arguments go, can promote peaceful and prosperous societies, and fully-formed democracies can be strongly divisive in social terms. The key for Bolaji-Adio is to understand what is effective in practice.43

Ironically, considering the heated political debates that preceded the approval of SDG16, for some there is a risk that SDG16 might end up offering more of a stylized governance,44 the kind of technocratic solution that has been long criticized for reflecting the content of a “techno-liberal peace”, which does not necessarily cater to the needs and goals of the South (we will come back to this point below when we discuss methodological difficulties in SSC on P&D, as many of these “technical” issues are complex and highly political). Hence, the need for peace is consensual but the question is: what approach to peace? In that sense, peace as expressed in SDG16 is as good as it is contextualized, complemented by other SDGs, and supported not only by an inclusive understanding of rights but also by a fair understanding of responsibilities. It is interesting to explore how this notion compares to the concept of sustaining peace, how the latter has been mobilized in official documents and speeches in the South, and what that all represents in terms of the potential role for SSC on P&D.
ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

SDG 16
Promote peaceful and inclusive societies, with access to justice for all

- Reduced Inequalities
  - SDG 10
    - Target 10.3 and 10.6: address equal opportunity and the need to reduce inequalities of outcome by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices affecting vulnerable groups and ensuring equal access to the services and benefits of society
    - Strengthen representation and rule for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions, which has the potential to strengthen the participation of these countries in global governance (Target 16.8).

- Inclusive & Sustainable Cities
  - SDG 11
    - Target 11.3: ensuring universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces is directly related to the promotion of SDG 16. It addresses a relatively few often classified as fragile states, classified as having poor access to the services and remit to serious risks that make cities vulnerable.

- Sustainable Land Use
  - SDG 15
    - All of its targets address the lack of environmental regulations and legislation. The fragile enforcement of law allows the exploitation of natural resources and the degradation of ecosystems and species. Moreover, since conflict destroys the natural capital that societies have, SDG 16 can contribute to guaranteeing production and protecting biodiversity.

- Decent Work & Economic Growth
  - SDG 8
    - Target (especially 8.7) focus on securing decent and productive employment for all in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity. Together with SDG 16, it is a potent strategy to deal with tensions, social divisions and the instability that lead to conflicts.

- Gender Equality
  - SDG 5
    - Target 5.1 to 5.3 focus on securing economic and political rights for women and girls, addressing gender inequality in education, promoting gender equality in employment and addressing violence and harassment.

- Good Health & Well-being
  - SDG 3
    - Target 3.1: seeks to strengthen the capacity of all countries, especially developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks. With SDG 16 (especially target 16.A), SDG 3 can help improve representative decision-making at all levels (16.7).

- Quality Education
  - SDG 4
    - Target 4.1 to 4.7: ensures universal primary education, promoting a culture of peace and non-violence, eliminating gender disparities in education, ensuring equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable in addition to substantially increasing the supply of qualified teachers in developing countries, are directly connected to the need to ensure representation, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels (16.3).

- No Poverty
  - SDG 1
    - Poverty has been increasingly concentrated in fragile states. In this sense, addressing poverty is essential in the context of peace and non-violence. It includes poverty eradication and achieving equal opportunities and rights for all individuals (16.6).

- Strengthen Partnerships to Achieve Goals
  - SDG 17
    - Targets 17.16 and 17.19: partnership with a multistakeholder approach to support the achievement of the SDGs, particularly in developing countries; to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity; also related to the strengthening of relevant national institutions and capacity building.

**Figure 1:** SDG 16 and specific targets of SDGs 10, 11, 15 and 17.
Southern Positions on Peace, Sustaining Peace and P&D

What the United Nations Sustaining Peace twin resolutions achieved was in part the formalization of a series of long-held arguments by academics and practitioners, such as “the recognition that efforts to sustain peace [are] necessary not only once conflict [has] broken out but also long beforehand, through the prevention of conflict and addressing its root causes”. Moreover, in the same vein, the best remedy and much desired results of such a peace is precisely development: “Inclusive and sustainable development not only is an end in itself but also happens to be the best defense against the risks of violent conflict.” This all means, as with SDG16, that politics is on the table. Peace is political. Development has also always been political, of course, but in the past few years it has become increasingly more technical, populated by M&E systems that are often focused more on making data available than on incentivizing real learning from them.48 Development has even once been famously called “the anti-politics machine”.49 The political content of both peace and development is perhaps intensified as they are made not simply complementary, but circularly related—there is no end and no beginning to P&D, just constant mutual feeding between peace and development. This complexity is hard to manage, both in political and operational terms but needs to be recognized and embraced if we are to promote stronger partnerships to achieve durable peace and inclusive development.

Let us say that “sustaining peace begins with identifying those attributes and assets that have sustained social cohesion, inclusive development, the rule of law, and human security— the factors that together contribute to a peaceful society”50. One can immediately see the circularity in that reasoning. This is good, in theory, as it complexities what is indeed complex. However, it brings obvious challenges to the way government, regional and international bodies along with other actors establish priorities, attribute results and implement projects. Perhaps for that reason, the concept of sustaining peace has not yet become widely used; its mobilization varies, and it is still too soon to map out in conclusive ways what this variety entails. Nevertheless, we made a first attempt at listing a number of positions regarding the concepts of peace and sustaining peace in the South (see list in Annex II). These examples can provide useful insights regarding the peace and development agenda. The points made below are based on the table in Annex II (non-exhaustive) and are indications of important paths for further research rather than final positions. We understand these perspectives change all the time in international politics, so that the points highlighted below are intended as indications of currents affairs; in addition, countries were randomly selected to offer some diversity.

Africa

• The African Union has been particularly eloquent on this matter: “The very idea of peacebuilding and sustaining peace is strongly grounded in the long-entrenched principle that peace cannot be achieved without development or vice-versa and that both peace and development cannot thrive without human rights and good governance.” (See Annex II) Perhaps not surprisingly, considering the role of African countries in approving SDG16 and also perhaps indicative of the potential relation between a broadly understood SDG16 and the concept of sustaining peace, African countries and regional organizations seem more active in advancing the P&D agenda in those terms. Moreover, as we will see below, there are also important lessons learned from operationalizing these views on the continent.

• Ethiopia emphasizes national ownerships and local capacities: “Ultimately, sustaining peace is of course a national endeavor, and national ownership and inclusivity of all stakeholders, including the government, the private sector and civil society is key to achieving the objective of sustaining peace. What is really required of the UN and international partners is to help build national and local capacities for sustaining peace.” (See Annex II)

• South Africa clearly views peace and development as interconnected: “The idea of peacebuilding is based strongly on the understanding that peace cannot exist without development and development cannot thrive without peace and stability. This should underpin the UN’s approach to fulfilling its role in the maintenance of international peace and security, which is strongly dependent on a prosperous and peaceful Africa.” (See Annex II)


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Asia

• Angola also stated that “implementing the sustaining peace agenda means putting Member States and their populations in the lead, prioritizing political solutions and prevention, and leveraging in the UN’s three pillars—peace and security, human rights and development—in a mutually reinforcing way.” (See Annex II)

• China goes along similar lines, making references to the United Nations system and the values it represents: “China’s foreign policy of peace proposes and have taken the lead in practicing a new Asian approach of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and have worked all along to uphold, promote and contribute to international and regional security. China is firmly committed to pursuing the peaceful development path, maintaining the international order with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter at its core, fostering a new type of international relations of win-win cooperation, and building a community of shared future for all mankind.” Although the concept of sustaining peace itself is not mentioned, the rhetoric is similar (other official documents and speeches include sustaining peace in the title, but again do not develop this concept53). Key words seem to be “order” and “security”. (See Annex II)

• Indonesia is a strong voice in favor of the agenda, even though the concept of sustaining peace is not present in the referred document: “Peace is not merely an absence of war. Peace is underpinned by activities that ensure long-term avenues by which common people, including women and youth, can sustain their lives in a decent way. Ensure sustainable development to prevent relapse into conflict. For our part, Indonesia will continue its peacebuilding efforts, through the South-South and Triangular Cooperation to complement the ongoing international peacebuilding efforts. This includes our efforts with our brothers and sisters in Africa.” (See Annex II)

• The Republic of Korea has also been a strong voice in the agenda (leading an important session on sustaining peace at the 2018 High-level Political Forum), which seems based on its past and current tense relationship with North Korea. “The sustaining peace concept encompasses the entire life-cycle of conflict—before, during, and after—while placing prevention in the forefront and through all three pillars of UN’s engagement—peace and security, development and human rights. In essence, sustaining peace is the latest in the evolution of our understanding of peace and the ways to achieve it.” (See Annex II)

Middle East

• Islamic countries seem to emphasize the role of regional cooperation on P&D: “[t]he Islamic Declaration recognizes peace as a prerequisite for achieving development and promoting connectivity between the countries and its respective regions” and “[t]he countries stressed that cooperation between them contributes to the strengthening of peace, prosperity and stability for their people and the region.” (See Annex II)

• The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) also stresses the role of prevention, which, as seen, is key to the notion of sustaining peace as an objective, which involves “[e]nhancing the role of the OIC in peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy, promotion of dialogue and mediation”. (See Annex II)

Latin America

For Latin Americans, the concept has not appeared to have taken much of a hold, although apparently no country necessarily opposes the agenda.54 Mercosur/Mercosul, a regional organization, for instance, has not been vocal in terms of sustaining peace, even though it routinely objects to the use of force in the region (see below). There seems to be an issue on how several countries define violence and how peace is placed in that context when dialoguing with international institutions.


54 Venezuela is not taken into account due to its current situation. This is not linked to ideological reasons. Cuba has recently stated, for instance: “Sustaining peace would also require ending the causes of conflict. Priority must be given to the 2030 Agenda, including building the capacities of developing countries through, among other things, development assistance and technological transfers with no strings attached.” See https://www.un.org/apps/en/2018/fit12013.doc.htm. In any case, the table represents what is still initial research and does not cover all countries and regional actors.
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- Mercosur/Mercosul defends the importance of elements such as rule of law and human rights, although these are seldom referred to in terms of building peace or similar terms: "The bloc reaffirms the commitment of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace, based on respect for international law and the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter" (See Annex II)

- El Salvador focuses on the role of national dialogue and the need for a just economic order: "El Salvador... recognizes the importance of multilateralism to address global challenges such as peace, a more just economic order, climate change, and sustainable development. In this context, the country insists on the need for constructive dialogue, concertation and cooperation, and the strengthening of integration mechanisms and regional alliances. In the face of crises and conflicts that affect the world, it is important to privilege dialogue and political solutions." (See Annex II)

- Colombia focuses on reconciliation and justice: "Peace needs to be built with a rule of law that combines the public goods of security and justice. The Colombian government will work to ensure that the process of demobilization, disarmament and reininsertion advanced in the last few years is successfully carried forward. They will provide those who have been committed to a genuine reincorporation to the law, subject to the principles of truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition, the proper opportunities for progress and protection." (See Annex II)

- Brazil has discussed the need to overcome the "illusion of sequencing" in peace: "Subscribing to the concept of sustaining peace in order to overcome the ‘illusion of sequencing’ between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, [Brazil] urged the Security Council to examine the root causes of conflicts, including economic and social dimensions, and incorporate key peacebuilding objectives into mission mandates from the outset." It has also recently stated: "We should be all committed to demonstrate our resolve to focus on political dialogue and preventive actions"; “[t]he use of sanctions and military force should always be the last resort and, when it so happens, it must be in line with the provisions of the UN Charter’; and "[w]hat we really need is better diplomacy to face the numerous challenges that still lie ahead". (See Annex II)

- Guatemala also supports the link between peace, prosperity and development, and warns against intrusions on sovereignty: "The search for development in the region also leads to peace and prosperity. The government of Guatemala believes that respect for the sovereignty of each country is necessary; full freedom is guaranteed; and recognize the beliefs, values and principles of each state; and not the imposition of a bureaucratic global agenda that dictates what they create, must be." (See Annex II)

At this stage, these are important indications that P&D has gained momentum, and it will be important to observe how sustaining peace takes shape. While sustaining peace is not expressly part of the 2030 Agenda, SDG16 is, and its progress review in 2019 at the High-level Political Forum might provide important insights into where the discussion on peace is going in the development agenda. We would point at two possible conceptual alignments in the future: it seems the old concept of positive peace is an important building block of both sustaining peace and SDG16. In Galtung’s 2011 article derived from his seminal work, three types of positive peace are named in terms of cooperation, equality and culture of peace. By unifying cooperation and equality, and giving culture a central role, positive peace feeds into sustaining peace with what in fact is the understanding that has been historically manifested in the principles of SSC, at least in theory (more on this ahead). Moreover, sustaining peace implies deliberate policy objectives to achieve “everyday peace”, which not only means that demand is driven by real local conditions, including political will, but that true peace is neither accidental, nor can it be externally imposed. Regarding the second possible future conceptual convergence, it seems that instead of a linear conception of peace, we are moving towards circular understandings of P&D. Southern narratives could be especially positioned to contribute here, with their historical critiques of Northern forms of knowledge and their defense of indigenous cosmologies that favor relationality over binaries, and solidarity over individuality.

Another important and related point to be made in regard to the indications above is that a good many of the documents in the table in Annex II reinforce the role of cooperation in achieving P&D, especially SSC, as already seen in the few highlighted above. Combined with the conceptual insights just discussed, we can argue there is a case to be made for SSC on P&D.


57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Regarding
As the conceptual issues around P&D take shape, SSC seems well suited to contribute to several important areas. We want to explore these in the next few pages in terms of regional and cross-regional initiatives.

Two aspects of SSC are apparently crucial to the kind of action needed in the context of P&D: solidarity, as a value, and proximity (of all kinds), as a reality, both of which seem to be facilitated by regional approaches, although not exclusively so. As mentioned, regional organizations have been at the forefront of key projects and mechanisms in all continents. They have also perhaps been swifter in embracing P&D, even if operational challenges and political obstacles abound. Indeed, we have recently observed the increasing role played by regions in development cooperation, especially in the South, where financial resources are fewer and huge development and security challenges persist.
African regional organizations, as seen above, have offered one of the strongest cases of alignment, both with sustaining peace and SDG16. The African Union’s Agenda 2063, for instance, articulated SDG16 in three of its major goals, related to the preservation of democratic values, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law; the establishment of capable institutions and transformative leadership; and the preservation of peace, security and stability.60

Some Asian discourses go along the same lines. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s view on peace also seems to reflect the understanding of peace as goal and process; it is as concerned with form as content: “In its approach to common goals and to issues that could lead to conflict, ASEAN places a premium on dialogue and consultation in place of posturing and confrontation...It considers mutual respect and understanding...as vital to the peace and stability of the region and to the future of the association itself”.61

In South America, the Union of South American Nations’ 2011 Constitutive Treaty, recognized regional cooperation as a way to advance sustainable development in support of strengthening citizen security, as well as a mechanism of deepening South American integration through the exchange of information, experiences and training.

Yassine-Hamdan and Pearson, in turn, highlight the role of the Arab League in mediation: “when the Arab League was a mediator, a larger percentage of the reasons for conflict (79.2% vs. 61.8% for a non-Arab League mediator) involved ideology, security, independence, and ethnicity”.62 The Arab League is an interesting case for a discussion on the role of SSC on P&D. Data presented by Yassine-Hamdan and Pearson63 show that, on the one hand, there is a tendency for the League to offer or be called upon for mediation in conflicts that are more difficult to resolve; that the League was a mediator commonly when disputes involved more difficult issues of ideology, security, independence and ethnicity; that the effort was likely to occur on one of the party’s territories; and that League mediators most often used a directive strategy.64

On the other hand, the authors point out that the “Arab League mediation on the whole appears no more likely to result in a partial (23.8% vs. 26.0%) or a full settlement (0.0% vs. 2.6%) than other forms of mediation. Nevertheless, League mediation was more likely to result in a ceasefire (28.6% vs. 10.8%), and less likely to be unsuccessful (47.6% vs. 60.6%).”65

This might suggest that SSC on P&D is more about process than what is usually understood in the field as “results”, which means that both our notion of results needs to adapt to that field and that we need a conceptual and operational framework that values processes as much as “results”.

Countries in the South seem to lean towards other Southern countries for cooperation in sensitive issues, such as those that compose a conceptual and operational framework as much as “results”. In regional SSC on P&D, one practical factor seems to be key: geographic proximity. Countries facing security or development problems are not isolated; crises cross borders in many shapes and forms. Today, migration, for instance, is as much a concern in the 2030 Agenda as any other; the United Nations document prescribes “orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well managed migration policies.”66 Considering 85 per cent of the world’s displaced people are living in developing countries,67 this is an example of a P&D concern that is always in proximity.

Thus, when solidarity is combined with pragmatism, perhaps, regional powers are usually the first on the ground in one way or another.68 Most importantly, cultural proximity counts significantly in demand-driven cooperation, as in SSC. Speaking the same language, sharing religious beliefs, remembering the same historical events, having gone through similar problems—these are all types of proximity. Opposed to this sense of commonality, Besharati and Rawhani speak, for instance, of the somewhat anthropological difficulty some actors in the South experience when operating in “DAC-like” coordination fora and systems, because of political orientations as well as different social codes.69 The considerably long history of cooperation between South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provides a case in point both for solidarity and proximity. Not only are the numbers surprising, but qualitative assessments show South African cultural proximity to be a crucial factor for SSC.

60 African Union’s Agenda 2063: Linkages with the Sustainable Development Goals, 2014.
63 The authors highlight that the sample was small but results were suggestive.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Target 10.7 of the SDGs. See also International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2017), “Migration in the 2030 Agenda”.
69 DAC stands for Development Assistance Committee, of the OECD.
70 Besharati, N. and Rawhani, C. in: SAIA (South African Institute of International Affairs) research team, the case study revealed that between 2001 and 2015 South Africa spent at least ZAR8.5 billion (over $1 billion) on DRC-related SSC...It surpassed the DRC’s former colonial master, Belgium, and almost equalled DFID’s development assistance to the DRC in that same year.”71 Through the implementation of its own quality-quant process- and relationship-oriented methodology, SAIA concludes, however, that “the degree to which South Africa benefits from the co-operation is questionable”. Surprisingly, perhaps—and to be further analyzed—they add: “South Africa’s motivations remain lofty and idealistic, such as the promotion of a peaceful, stable and prosperous DRC for a better-integrated region.”72

Box 1: South Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo: proximity

South Africa was one of the first countries to deploy peacekeeping forces to DRC in 1999, 2001 and 2003. “Under the old ODA definition some of South Africa’s defence and security expenditures in the DRC might have been excluded from the accounting of its developmental co-operation. However, from an African point of view a peaceful DRC is an essential precondition for a stable and prosperous Great Lakes region.”70 South Africa took command of the troops in 2016 from the Brazilians. Before that, it cooperated in providing security for the 2006 elections, in addition to offering material support and training, including to police forces. Throughout the years, many South African departments took action in DRC in several areas, from technical assistance to anti-corruption legislation to training civil servants. “In the accounting exercise undertaken by the SAIA (South African Institute of International Affairs) research team, the case study revealed that between 2001 and 2015 South Africa spent at least ZAR8.5 billion (over $1 billion) on DRC-related SSC...It surpassed the DRC’s former colonial master, Belgium, and almost equalled DFID’s development assistance to the DRC in that same year.”71 Through the implementation of its own quality-quant process- and relationship-oriented methodology, SAIA concludes, however, that “the degree to which South Africa benefits from the co-operation is questionable”. Surprisingly, perhaps—and to be further analyzed—they add: “South Africa’s motivations remain lofty and idealistic, such as the promotion of a peaceful, stable and prosperous DRC for a better-integrated region.”72

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
Proximity, nevertheless, also occurs, if there is political will and the proper support. A characteristic of SSC is precisely peer-learning, a focus on exchange, being together and dialoguing, which does not require much financial support but does require political will. Indeed, “[p]articularly at a time of global austerity, SSC shows mutual complementarities to peacebuilding, by redefining peacebuilding as “an expression of solidarity and shared experiences”.”73 In the “global partnership” promoted by the 2030 Agenda, “[s]uch peer learning as well as knowledge, experience and technology sharing have proved vital to developing innovative forms of partnerships.”74

**Box 2: African Peer Review Mechanism: peer-learning**

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) offers voluntary, qualitative in-depth assessment of the political situation in African countries, in line with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Launched in 2003, its goal is to improve governance in Africa through peer-learning. There are five stages in conducting an APRM review, including a participatory national self-assessment, a peer review conducted by heads of state and preparation of a national plan of action.75 “Although APRM assessments might not allow easy comparisons between countries…they provide a rich source of information on what particular aspects of governance and approaches to peace and security are effective for development across a diverse set of countries. Having this information is important for the success of Goal 16. The international community cannot marshal convincing arguments about governance and peace and security if they rely primarily on statistical indicators.”76

Bolaji-Adio compares SDG16 indicators with the APRM qualitative assessment, an example of which is below.

She does warn against APRM also working with a stylized notion of governance and suggests it be made complementary to other approaches to P&D (more ahead).

- What measures have been put in place to promote and enforce civil rights?
- What steps have been taken to facilitate due process and equal access to justice for all?
- What weight do provisions establishing the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution carry in practice?
- To what extent is the judiciary independent?
- What measures have been taken to promote and protect the rights of women in the country?

74 Mathur, A. (2014) “Role of South–South Cooperation and Emerging Powers in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding”, NUPI Report no. 4, p. 13. Moreover, we can say “technology” here can even include, in the context of SSC, “social technology”: “The concept of tecnologia social points towards political processes that create places and opportunities to redefine the arrangements and rules among social groups, artefacts and methods used in everyday life, particularly for production and consumption. They are built to address a demand or redefine a problem, thereby triggering social transformation”. Marlei Pozzebon & Isleide Arruda Fontenelle (2018): “Fostering the post-development debate: the Latin American concept of tecnologia social”, Third World Quarterly, p. 2.
75 Bolaji-Adio 2015, p. 11.
76 Ibid., p. vi.
77 Chat with Ibitsam Husary, MIFTAH, Palestine.
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South-South cooperation and its agenda have to be set by countries of the South and should continue to be guided by the principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit.92

There are important cultural traces in that solidarity. Many countries in the South share similar indigenous views on a state of well-being achieved through peace and solidarity, expressed in different words with similar meanings.

92 Murithi 2006.
Cross-Regional South-South Cooperation on P&D

As mentioned in the beginning, there is little systematized knowledge about SSC on P&D and that is especially the case in terms of cross-regional analyses. Nevertheless, some examples of cross-regional cooperation can give us clues as to the potential for constructed solidarity and proximity across continents. There are important instances of peer-learning derived from similar experiences with peace and development issues in the Global South that go beyond continental exchanges. As far as the current corpus of knowledge allows, we can generally make two rather humble points: cross-regional SSC denotes an important willingness to deal with the complex issues present in a broader understanding of peace as sustaining peace—or as we have been exploring here in terms of P&D; it also indicates preparedness to “go in” first, as with regional SSC, at least in terms of long-term technical cooperation in P&D (and not in financial terms). These two factors seem to point at both a certain positive level of constructed proximity and a certain hospitality on the part of the partner country that seems more likely to exist when exchanges take place in the context of SSC. Nevertheless, only continued investment in knowledge-sharing in this area will offer more conclusive insights about results and best practices.

Almost all emergent countries in the South have cooperation ties with African countries. Among them, Brazil has a history of engagement in the continent and elsewhere in the South in terms of P&D. Since 1989, Brazil has participated in 28 United Nations peacekeeping missions; it lobbyed for the creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and for it to be “a bridge between [the United Nations Security Council] and ECOSOC” and in 2014 Brazil occupied the PBC presidency, defending a broader understanding of peace as encompassing development concerns. The country has also engaged in several cases of mediation in the South (in that case, with mixed results). A key SSC cross-regional example was Brazil’s coordinating PBC country-specific configuration for Guinea-Bissau. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, Abdenur suggests that Brazilian diplomats “have repeatedly argued for the need to balance security-focused measures with efforts to foment socioeconomic development.” Although Guinea-Bissau entered the international concern list in 2006 as a hub for drug trade, Brazil argued other concerns also needed to be prioritized, like jobs and “chronic underdevelopment”, which facilitated instability. Brazil also invested in technical cooperation: Abdenur states, “ironically”, the biggest investment was in police and military training, but there were also initiatives in agriculture, health, education and culture. In addition, Guinea-Bissau is one of the greatest beneficiaries of Brazil’s undergraduate and graduate exchange programs: 1,336 students from Guinea-Bissau received scholarships to study in Brazilian universities from 2000 to 2013. In 2011, Brazil was also a key partner in supporting Guinea-Bissau towards achieving universal civil registration (an SDG16 target) through harmonization of public services and processes, development of awareness campaigns, and strengthening of civil servants’ capacities. Brazilian cooperation was, however, interrupted for a period, after the assassination of President Nino Vieira in 2009, and activities were only resumed in 2014, following elections. This interruption exemplifies the difficulties faced by Southern countries especially in cross-regional cooperation, separated by distances, in overcoming periods. In this case, there was also the fact that Brazil was going through an economic crisis, and in Abdenur’s view, there was also a lack of integration with United Nations efforts in peace operations. One can sum, often present in SSC. Nonetheless, Brazil was in Guinea-Bissau, and it was advancing a broader take on peace that seemed important for the country, with some positive results.

Another relevant case of cross-regional SSC on P&D is the general engagement of g7+

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The g7+ group of self-labelled fragile states was founded in 2010 and is composed of 20 countries in different (sub-)continents—Asia, Africa, Oceania, Middle East and Central America. As g7+ countries generally have a past and/or present context of conflict and violence, F2F countries tend to have perhaps higher tolerance to risk and a stronger connection through that experience of deeply-rooted security and development problems. Interestingly in the context of this article, one recent example of cross-regional F2F took place precisely in Guinea-Bissau. After a coup d'état in 2012, when all traditional donors left (among them some Southern partners, including Brazil, were not very active in this period for many reasons), “financial and technical assistance was provided to enable elections to go ahead in 2014.” Helder da Costa reiterated that “[c]ountries affected by conflict and fragility are lagging behind, therefore we need to be able to empower ourselves, to promote exchange of information and peer learning amongst ourselves.” It is said traditional donors insisted elections be held the end of 2013 but would not provide funding. Representatives from Guinea-Bissau requested support from Timor-Leste, in the context of work done by the g7+. A Timor-Leste mission visited the country, diagnosed the need to update electoral systems and provided an estimated sum almost seven times less than that provided by traditional donors. Another mission soon arrived and prepared the stage for the elections; a second instance of cooperation involved civil education campaigns, continuing IT and logistical support, organizing public debates, financial assistance and donations of material. The elections took place without incidents, and authorities praised the F2F as a success: “The support provided by our brothers, the people of Timor-Leste, was truly decisive...The Government and the people of Guinea-Bissau are grateful to the Timorese people and Government for their solidarity and assistance to the electoral process.”

We cannot derive major generalizations from these examples, nor should we, at least at this stage. It is, however, interesting to notice that the above cases of SSC can be seen as somewhat complementary. SSC worked with different Southern partners investing in diverse areas where geographical and other kinds of proximity (in addition to feasibility) led them. Like UNOSSC recently suggested, we see significant opportunities in these complementarities. An important question is: When facing the diverse range of possibilities in SSC, what makes SSC differentially important for P&D and what can be done to further its contributions?

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99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., pp. 22–25.
101 Ibid., p. 24.
102 Ibid.
Mobilizing South-South Cooperation principles for expanding and strengthening its positive contributions to P&D

The previous sections sought to show that SSC on P&D is, in fact, taking place. Moreover, we analyzed the ideas about peace and development brought to the table by Southern actors and how SSC core values are incentivizing regional and cross-regional cooperation in this area. With all this in mind, it is important now to move on to exploring evidence of how best practices of SSC on P&D can be furthered and strengthened. The SSC taking place in the context of P&D issues seems to point at specific SSC principles as crucial guidelines, so we will carefully examine how they are put into practice in these cases.

Let us go back to how the Global South Thinkers on Peace and Development defined peace: If peace is the acceptance of a shared future, then development is the path one takes to achieve that shared future. We believe this notion expresses support for the concept of sustaining peace as it extends beyond the 2030 Agenda, but also the conditions for a holistic take on SDG16 that would truly include positive peace, bringing it closer to sustaining peace by promoting a fair understanding of the responsibilities at stake for P&D in the South. We also believe SSC principles are a key gateway to these responsibilities. We begin by detailing our case for SSC on P&D through these principles.103

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103 Most, including us, consider the principles and elements in Figure 2 to be equally important, thus we have referred to all of them as “principles” here.

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The Nairobi outcome document adopted by the UN General Assembly established six principles of SSC...

- Respect for national sovereignty;
- National ownership and independence;
- Equality (horizontality);
- Non-conditionality;
- Non-interference in domestic affairs;
- Mutual benefits.

... and eight elements that should inform SSC practices:

- Common objectives and solidarity;
- Multi-stakeholder approach;
- National well-being;
- Promotion of National and collective self-reliance;
- Internationally agreed development goals;
- Alignment to National development priorities at the request of developing countries;
- Capacity development.

There are powerful critiques of business-as-usual both in peace and development. In terms of P&D, these have culminated in skepticism about traditional agendas that focus on Western jargon, like rule of law. Instead, it is argued that P&D issues are complex and profoundly contextual.
“Governance and peace and security are inherently political, historical and country-specific. Goal 16’s present orientation fails to acknowledge the range of regimes and institutions that have been effective in development, and how the distribution of power evolves over time in countries. Furthermore, there is a tendency with the good governance framework that underlies Goal 16 to project what it is that people need for development, though this may not correspond with what they want or what works best in practice.”

As seen, one of SSC’s key principles has historically been ownership—country-led solutions for country-specific problems. It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a thorough global analysis about whether that principle has been respected, but we can discuss how, in the instances when it apparently was, this led to more contextual approaches to P&D, which would be in line with the present holistic proposals regarding peace and development.

A few important elements in some SSC cases can shed light on how these contextual approaches might work to promote ownership. One element, and also an SSC principle, is in the very notion of peer-learning: education is a key factor for any discussion on P&D, but there are many ways to learn.

Peer-learning, with more horizontal exchanges and its unique format, is distinctly relevant. Moreover, contextuality implies flexibility: thus, peer-learning also plays a key role in adapting expectations.

Our initial examples revolve around “education for peace” or “culture of peace”, whereby SDGs 4 and 16 combine in important ways (see Figure 4).

United Nations Children’s Fund, Colombia and El Salvador developed cooperation along these lines. The project involved finding a flexible-enough modality to expand access in primary and secondary levels in a country ripe with gang violence. “Fast-Track Education”, a two-year project, sought “to develop and validate strategies for students’ retention and insertion of children who dropped out of school in the 15 more violent schools.”

The project reached 7,352 students; 95 at-risk children from the 13 schools received psychosocial support to prevent them from dropping out of school and joining gangs. One key aspect, garnered from existing documents, was the idea that the program itself needed to adapt to the needs, interests and resources of each school, using active methodologies so as to address the demands of “vulnerable” students.

In addition, Mexico later also cooperated in the education sector in El Salvador, helping to retain students in school. The country has a drop-out rate of 8,400 students per year. Until 2016, three Mexican missions had visited the country to assess the systems and provide advice. In 2017, El Salvador was replicating the project in other localities.

Approaches that emphasize the role of education, culture and other social factors for P&D tend to contribute in the long-run to strengthening “local capacities for peace”, which are essential for P&D. Education is the means of cultural transmission via excellence. A holistic approach to peace certainly entails investments in education that are capable of nurturing social cohesion, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, an inclusive understanding of community and belonging. SSC in the field of education for peace, therefore, can only work to the extent that these programs are country-led and based on local culture, needs and priorities.

106 Ibid.

Box 3: India and Education in Africa

India has invested massively in education and technical skills in Africa since 1964. “India claims that its cooperation with Africa is based on a partnership of mutual benefit and therefore is closely tied to trade and investments. Partnerships with Indian businesses are central to Indian cooperation in Africa.”

It is estimated 30 per cent of India’s cooperation is focused on this area. In 2011, as much as 65 per cent of India’s cooperation with Africa was directed at education and skills initiatives. India’s flagship program, the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), together with its Africa-specific corollary Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Program (SCAAP), offers courses for African civilians and military personnel, reaching 161 countries, and invests in other learning initiatives. One interesting project in Africa involves collaboration with the African Union: “As part of the ITEC initiative there have been ‘Hole-in-the-Wall’ projects, which are aimed at educating children in rural and urban slums in Namibia, Zambia and Uganda. In these projects, the AU will determine the location of the institutes, the host country will provide the land and construct the buildings and India will run the centres for three years, after which they are intended to be self-sustaining.”

The “Hole-in-the-Wall” is an Indian methodology and is symbolic in terms of SSC principles: it involves people taking ownership of their learning process, engaging with a certain content by themselves and making use of it according to their own interests. It started, literally with a computer placed in a hole in the wall for free use. It is, in essence, simple and cheap, demand-driven and flexible, since it needs to offer “entertaining content” that is captivating enough to get people interested and started, which involves acknowledging context. What it can achieve generally is, of course, limited, but it is about the processes more than the results. Knowing that it is possible to learn on one’s own can be a powerful force towards achieving one’s potential and building peace and sustainable development.

Approaches that emphasize the role of education, culture and other social factors for P&D tend to contribute in the long-run to strengthening “local capacities for peace”, which are essential for P&D. Education is the means of cultural transmission via excellence. A holistic approach to peace certainly entails investments in education that are capable of nurturing social cohesion, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, an inclusive understanding of community and belonging. SSC in the field of education for peace, therefore, can only work to the extent that these programs are country-led and based on local culture, needs and priorities.
**Demand-driven Cooperation: Legitimacy and long-term results**

If “peacebuilding has become a key forum for emerging powers to challenge the normative content of global governance by established powers”,113 it is because the reconfiguration of peacebuilding along the lines of concepts like sustaining peace and in the context of SSC has provided space for Southern ownership and Southern domestic conceptions of peace. If we ask “what role does the development of a specific approach to peace and peacebuilding play in each country’s drive to challenge the normative dominance of the liberal Western paradigm?”114 at this point, we can answer “an absolutely influencing one”. But perhaps it is more about the processes that surround that contestation than their actual results, that is, about coherence with a narrative of solidarity cooperation. Being historically principled along the lines of horizontality and solidarity, SSC brings to the fore the view that how cooperation is practiced is as important as its results, and processes—that is, the “how”—might be the results themselves. In that sense, instead of traditional effectiveness, we might say SSC emphasizes “coherence” with its principles and values. When asked why they had decided to measure their own so-called fragility since they are an essential part of their sovereignty, especially in such a strategic field and particularly for Southern countries, which must be equipped to properly explore such riches since they are an essential part of their economic profile. Moreover, all that knowledge and knowledge-sharing offer leverage and opportunities to demand responsible action on the part of international actors.

Many countries in the South are rich in mineral resources but plagued by numerous related problems associated with institutional capabilities and the temptation of corruption. In 2013 and 2014, F2F collaboration took place among several g7+ countries to prepare and publish a booklet compiling lessons learned. “Severing the link between resource extraction and conflict requires better risk identification, improved monitoring and safeguarding measures such as wealth-sharing agreements, sovereign wealth funds and efforts at greater transparency.”115 After this effort and the initial knowledge-sharing, the g7+ was in a position to ask the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to offer a platform for extractive industries, which UNEP is preparing together with the World Bank.116 Knowing the configuration of national mineral resources, mapping out mines, identifying groups that explore each area, visualizing environmental degradation—all this is crucial to national sovereignty, especially in such a strategic field and particularly for Southern countries, which need to be equipped to properly explore such riches since they are an essential part of their economic profile. Moreover, all that knowledge and knowledge-sharing offer leverage and opportunities to demand responsible action on the part of international actors.

**Mutual Benefits and No-interference: Sustaining Peace**

A key aspect of sustaining peace, and thus, the concept of peace for our Global South Thinkers on Peace and Development, is that there can be no peace without a vision of a shared future, and if that vision exists, solidarity is second nature; if solidarity exists, there can be a common future. In moments of violence or crises, it is common to point at spoilers and “peace blockers”.117 The Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) calls the latter “connectors” and the former “dividers”, in their “do no harm” approach. A holistic approach to peace, however, would see these all the way, not just after violence erupts, and although, for some, their image might be crystal clear (genocidaires come to mind), others would be blurred. García et al, in an interesting study about conflict-sensitive practices in Colombia, acknowledge the importance of doing no harm as a motto, but invites us to go beyond: the notion of conflict-sensitive practices looks at conflicts of interests and demands pro-activity or crises, it is common to point at spoilers and “peace blockers”.117 The Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) calls the latter “connectors” and the former “dividers”, in their “do no harm” approach. A holistic approach to peace, however, would see these all the way, not just after violence erupts, and although, for some, their image might be crystal clear (genocidaires come to mind), others would be blurred. García et al, in an interesting study about conflict-sensitive practices in Colombia, acknowledge the importance of doing no harm as a motto, but invites us to go beyond: the notion of conflict-sensitive practices looks at conflicts of interests and demands pro-activity towards them. García et al understand this to be a Northern approach as well but praise the transversalization of peace that the concept promoted in international cooperation and its awareness of structural root causes. Whatever insufficiencies it leaves, they attempt to address these via methodological adaptations that stress contextual aspects of P&D, integrate the perspectives of local people and, with that, have potential to constructively transform conflicts. To make that move, they focus on “gaps of attribution” as political issues: how do we know we are affected by P&D? Certain results are easily attributed; others are contributions. Solidarity, we can say, would entail accepting risks along with diminished and long-term results based on a trust in the process, rather than expecting clearly attributable results (we revisit this point in the next section).

Important examples of SSC on P&D that are strongly based in that principle can be found in the ECOWAS’ and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)’s cooperation efforts on the African continent.118 The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention framework works with two notions of prevention: operational prevention and structural prevention, which “focuses on peacebuilding through political and institutional reforms, capacity building, justice and the rule of law, reconciliation and reintegration, and peace education.”119

114 Ibid.
116 See https://www.maps.org/
117 Fragility spectrum approach to understanding fragility is thus intended as a counterweight to donor- and expert-led efforts to classify and measure fragile states.118 This view speaks to SSC as a motto, but invites us to go beyond: the notion of conflict-sensitive practices looks at conflicts of interests and demands pro-activity towards them. García et al understand this to be a Northern approach as well but praise the transversalization of peace that the concept promoted in international cooperation and its awareness of structural root causes. Whatever insufficiencies it leaves, they attempt to address these via methodological adaptations that stress contextual aspects of P&D, integrate the perspectives of local people and, with that, have potential to constructively transform conflicts. To make that move, they focus on “gaps of attribution” as political issues: how do we know we are affected by P&D? Certain results are easily attributed; others are contributions. Solidarity, we can say, would entail accepting risks along with diminished and long-term results based on a trust in the process, rather than expecting clearly attributable results (we revisit this point in the next section).
120 Peace, p. 379.
121 As one member of our group, Shagufta Ahmad (MENAPAR) calls them.
122 We follow the usual view that ECOWAS activities in these cases are instances of SSC—see UNDP (2017). South-South Cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Strategies for UNDP Engagement.
ECOWAS’ prevention begins with the work of field monitors who collect information locally, pass it onto focal points — two national representatives and one civil society representative. Next, the information is passed on to analysts, who add more information from open sources and provide weekly reports. For actual prevention, its implementing partner is the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), but ECOWAS also has strong connections with civil society organizations. It has responded successfully, according to Lucey and Arewa, to conflicts in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia, but results depend heavily on countries’ cooperation, and there are financial, logistical and political constraints. Moreover, there are “major elements where ECOWAS does not have a peacebuilding framework on which to draw”, like transitional justice and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).

The difficulties faced by ECOWAS are common to many RECs, which have unclear mandates and unpredictable funding and need to compete with other organizations. Similarly, for instance, IGAD originally addressed environmental issues, but has invested in its peace and security framework for a while now.

IGAD has a Civilian Capacities Initiative that was set up to enable officials from neighboring countries to work alongside officials from South Sudan. Lucey and Mesfin tell us IGAD oversaw the project’s initiation (with a limited role), and civil service support officers (CSSOS) from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda were seconded on a bilateral basis. “These countries paid the salaries of the secondees, and Norway contributed to programme management and operational costs. The [United Nations Development Programme] provided technical assistance.” The project was praised for its innovative solutions and its ownership aspect. Such a contextual approach seems to have been consolidated: in 2014, IGAD adopted a Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development framework based on detailed country analysis. IGAD is said to also encourage engagement with traditional mechanisms to resolve conflicts.

Despite some considerable successes, both ECOWAS and IGAD are said to be better off focusing on their comparative advantages, which include local legitimacy, cultural proximity and knowledge of the contexts, leaving expensive activities like Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) to other bodies, as long as there is communication and integration among all efforts. That way, SSC seems to draw considerable strength from solidarity and common objectives, but as much as it can gain from its conflict-sensitive approaches, it seems important to avoid doing harm by raising expectations. Some argue sustaining peace “must be positioned above all the different sectors, akin to a meta-policy that builds on and accounts for all other policies. All policies must be infused with the intention to sustain peace”. This seems coherent, but then what about the results?
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The Technical is Political

Considering the role of SSC on P&D in terms of the principles and values just discussed leads to important methodological challenges. In a sense, the potential, the challenges and the dilemmas described above take shape in methodologies that may or may not incentivize a holistic approach to P&D. Moreover, as the development field seemingly becomes ever more technocratic and there are talks of the “data revolution” defended by the 2030 Agenda possibly costing something between $60 and $140 billion, 131 it is crucial we take notice of the dilemmas at stake.

SSC entails at least two major challenges: a focus on processes, which are harder to track, evaluate and attribute impacts to; and the challenge of how to offer enough qualitative analysis without compromising systematization and accessibility.

These are not merely technical issues; they are essentially political. Organizations want attribution for the sake of accountability; and SSC has been said to rely too much on anecdotal evidence and to offer little systematized data, which makes investments in qualitative studies perhaps less intuitive. Yet, all examples of SSC on P&D show how important it is to understand context specificities, including what is understood by peace and development.

The transversalization of the concepts of peace currently debated has brought along, in the words of García et al, “a healthy modesty in relation to impacts” 132 driving the authors to develop a complementary methodology focused on contribution, rather than attribution, as seen above. For that, peace is locally defined, and impacts are considered in terms of how actors see the consequences of their own actions relative to that notion of peace, instead of a standardized one. Monitoring a peace process, for instance, is then not about analyzing the conflict itself but rather specific actions by specific actors. 133 An important aspect of that methodology is that monitoring itself is done through dialogue, which for the authors, reinforces cooperation. 134 It also looks at the processes underpinning practices. For them, this methodology differs from traditional ones precisely for its qualitative character and its focus on processes.

Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaut, in turn, look specifically at SDG16 and the dialogue that led to its establishment and the selection of its indicators, contrasting these with other possibilities. For them, it is key to develop indicators and data collection mechanisms that are based both on perception and experience, for instance, mobilizing both administrative and survey data. The latter would be more representative of the voice of the people and their perceptions, which may differ from what administrative data say. Experience is based on victimization, whereas perception amalgamates many important social factors that should be taken into account in a complementary way. Moreover, the authors followed the discussions that led to the selection of indicators for SDG16 and offer a description of how African countries came to the table much more prepared than other countries, which they strongly attribute to African experiences with the issues under the SDG16 umbrella. These experiences had by that time taken shape with the GPS-SHaSA (Governance, Peace and Security-Strategy for Harmonization of Statistics in Africa), a survey program launched by the African Union. The program involves 20 countries on the continent conducting household surveys to measure governance, peace and security.

The authors highlight the discrepancies found in that data, which could have been caused by the role of the media, specific histories of violence and other contextual elements, and suggest there was a clearly diagnosed need to combine perception and experience data in order to get a sense of “the specificities in different national contexts.”

Bolaji-Adio also stresses the need to use a combined methodology for issues of P&D. She discusses the two-tiered system developed by the g7+ that offers global comparable indicators and national specific ones. She says, however, that this is not enough for governance and P&D and suggests “(i) [utilizing] indicators that are adaptable and not inclined towards stylized concepts of ‘good’ governance and (ii) [looking] beyond neatly packaged indicators towards more in-depth qualitative assessments, including enhanced regional peer review initiatives.”

These suggestions involve taking processes seriously, doing complementary good qualitative analyses and adapting to national contexts for data collection and analysis. Exploring these issues is extremely important and would require more research. One can see already, however, how these elements are absolutely connected to SSC principles and values: solidarity, ownership solidarity, ownership, demand-drivenness and mutual benefits, for instance, and mutual benefits, for instance, are not only about results but how one gets to them. This is a crucial path for future analysis.

133 Ibid., p. 37.
134 Ibid., p. 44.
We have seen here the great potential that SSC has to make a positive impact on P&D; moreover, we have seen how it offers conceptual possibilities for doing so, in alignment with the current understandings of sustaining peace. Not less important is the fact that SSC actors have shown political willingness to be engaged with P&D issues. There are, therefore, two key aspects that need to be emphasized about the role of SSC on P&D, in terms of a) knowledge production; and b) political momentum.

First, it is crucial that knowledge production in the areas of SSC on P&D follow progress that is actually taking place in practice, and that this knowledge be systematized and disseminated. Moreover, all that knowledge and knowledge-sharing offer leverage and opportunities to demand responsible action on the part of international actors, action that can support and appropriately complement SSC on P&D.

Second, we have seen here how countries in the South seem to lean towards other Southern countries for cooperation in sensitive issues, such as those that compose P&D. With the power of the 2030 Agenda, the momentum it generates for both SSC and P&D, and most importantly, considering this cooperation is, in fact, taking place and showing great potential, it is time to harness this momentum and lead the way to discuss SSC on P&D at BAPA+40.

If we do not galvanize this willingness to act now, when we have strong cases and favorable inclination of the field, not only might SSC fail to occupy the important role it can occupy in the global partnership for the SDGs and, consequently, for P&D, but it might also lose momentum by side-stepping the challenge that is becoming central to the current agenda.
We recommend first and foremost that SSC actors turn their attention in decisive ways to P&D – because this is already being done to some extent with considerable positive results; most Southern actors have stated their desire to take part in engaging with P&D initiatives; and there is a window of opportunity for doing it and doing it well.\(^{137}\) This comes in two levels, mirroring the conclusions above:

- This decisive turn of attention means continuously producing knowledge that can support this political commitment. We recommend that SSC actors invest in knowledge production regarding their P&D initiatives, considering that current political debates encourage cooperation in this area.
- And importantly, it can be practically and politically done by including thoughts on SSC on P&D in national documents and speeches in preparation for BAPA+40, not only descriptively, but also prescriptively, reinforcing the very principles of SSC.

In that sense, we also specifically recommend that the understanding of results not be restricted to traditional views on “effectiveness” but be open to “coherence”, which invokes principles, values and commitments already present in the field;

- This involves moving from effectiveness to coherence when discussing the role of SSC, especially on P&D, but not exclusively.
- It also involves referring to key SSC principles more often, not only in political discourses, but also when debating M&E.

We also recommend that M&E systems rely equally on qualitative and quantitative analysis.

- This can be done by creating hubs that can congregate and empower well-established knowledge centers, like RECs and think tanks and to centralize knowledge production based on qualitative and quantitative analyses, following clear methodologies. This involves facilitating flows of information and avoiding fragmentation, but also having analyses that are more systematized and accessible;
- For these M&E systems, process-oriented methodologies being developed in the South should be thoroughly considered, since processes seem to be the underlying means for SSC in practice and are intrinsically related to coherence.

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137 By “SSC actors” here we mean all actors involved in designing and implementing SSC practices and projects – local governmental offices and agencies, central offices, nongovernmental institutions, think tanks, universities and so forth.
4. In terms of addressing fragmentation at all levels, we recommend SSC bodies study the potential for further cross-regional cooperation as a true testament to “constructed solidarity”, that is, as a test to deliberate practices towards sustaining peace.

- UNOSSC and the United Nations in general can be brokers since that dialogue is often made difficult by distance and the comparatively fewer cross-regional fora on SSC.

5. We finally recommend that Southern countries clearly express their commitment to sustaining peace, SDG16 and all SDGs as a path to achieve durable peace with inclusive development. This means offering a cohesive discourse that can lead to more coherent cooperation and strengthen SSC as a block in terms of cooperation modalities.

- This means that Southern countries should leverage this momentum to discuss international responsibilities over P&D, that is, the actors’ responsibilities beyond national borders, which means social justice on a global scale;

- It also means Southern countries in SSC should not shy away from discussing politics and geopolitics, as history has shown that an apparent avoidance in the recent past has cost important opportunities to further the interests of Southern countries and, more importantly, because P&D is highly political, reducing it to technical issues would mean replicating business-as-usual.
Risks

• The demand-driven character of SSC offers opportunities for innovation and ownership while also posing potential risks - for example, risks of fragmentation and challenges to long-term strategies. Current efforts for institutionalization might lead to a lack of flexibility. There is a need to balance both by using tailored and adaptable solutions.

• Contextuality does not mean relativism of values and principles. On the contrary, here we have highlighted the principles of SSC as common values. If a principle is poorly applied and ultimately weakens peace and development, there is a risk that context and principles like non-intervention will be used against those very same values. As SSC gets more involved in P&D issues, it might need clearer guidelines as to what constitutes omission and how to deal with such dilemmas.

Questions for the Future

Since sustaining peace and the role of SSC on P&D have made prevention of conflicts a high priority, it might be worth pursuing the question of how to prevent the loss of positive peace? That is, beyond promoting peace, how do we avoid losing social cohesion and everything that keeps a society together?

(That is, if we do not see these as just two ways on the same road.)
## ANNEX I

### SDG16 and Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>16.1</th>
<th>16.2</th>
<th>16.3</th>
<th>16.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.1.1</td>
<td>Number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population, by sex and age</td>
<td>16.2.1</td>
<td>Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms</td>
<td>16.4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1.2</td>
<td>Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause</td>
<td>16.2.2</td>
<td>Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation</td>
<td>16.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1.3</td>
<td>Proportion of population subjected to physical, psychological or sexual violence in the previous 12 months</td>
<td>16.2.3</td>
<td>Proportion of young women and men aged 18–29 years who experienced sexual violence by age 18</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1.4</td>
<td>Proportion of population that feel safe walking alone around the area they live</td>
<td>16.3.1</td>
<td>Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms</td>
<td>16.5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.3.2</td>
<td>Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population</td>
<td>16.3.2</td>
<td>Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms</td>
<td>16.5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.5.1</td>
<td>Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation</td>
<td>16.5.2</td>
<td>Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.5.2</td>
<td>Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services</td>
<td>16.7.1</td>
<td>Proportions of positions (by sex, age, persons with disabilities and population groups) in public institutions (national and local legislatures, public service, and judiciary) compared to national distributions</td>
<td>16.7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.6.1</td>
<td>Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar)</td>
<td>16.6.2</td>
<td>Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.6.2</td>
<td>Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services</td>
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<td>16.7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.7.1</td>
<td>Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services</td>
<td>16.7.2</td>
<td>Proportion of population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group</td>
<td>16.8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.8.1</td>
<td>Proportion of members and voting rights of developing countries in international organizations</td>
<td>16.8.2</td>
<td>Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.8.2</td>
<td>Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services</td>
<td>16.9.1</td>
<td>Proportion of children under 5 years of age whose births have been registered with a civil authority, by age</td>
<td>16.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.9.1</td>
<td>Proportion of children under 5 years of age whose births have been registered with a civil authority, by age</td>
<td>16.9.2</td>
<td>Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services</td>
<td>16.10.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.10.1</td>
<td>Number of verified cases of killing, kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture of journalists, associated media personnel, trade unionists and human rights advocates in the previous 12 months</td>
<td>16.10.2</td>
<td>Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information</td>
<td>16.10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.10.2</td>
<td>Number of countries that adopt and implement constitutional, statutory and/or policy guarantees for public access to information</td>
<td>16.11</td>
<td>Proportion of the population who believe decision-making is inclusive and responsive, by sex, age, disability and population group</td>
<td>16.11.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
As explained in the text, this table is here offered as an annex for further consultation and research for those interested. It is not in any way an exhaustive table: it does not include all countries and organizations and documents were randomly chosen by date and subject. We understand these are perspectives, not commitments nor fixed positions, as such policy debates tend to be continuously changing. We have quoted directly from the documents in columns "(Sustaining) Peace Definition" and "Actionable Proposals," although the titles of these columns are our own. Also in the last column, one can have an idea of how specific applications of these definitions vary. We hope the table offers a path for further research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, Territory or Organization</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>(Sustaining) Peace Definition</th>
<th>Key Ideas</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Actionable Proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>Briefing by Albin E. F. Ngounou, Permanent Representative of the United Nations Mission to the United Nations Peacebuilding Council</td>
<td>High-level Jamming on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>24 April 2018</td>
<td>&quot;The very idea of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in a conflict-prone area is founded on the principle that peace cannot be achieved without development and security, and that both peace and development remain an on-going process towards human rights and good government.&quot;</td>
<td>1. Good governance&lt;br&gt;2. Promotion of an ownership approach.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.peacebuilding.org/peac">www.peacebuilding.org/peac</a>...</td>
<td>1) First, the urgent need to strengthen our cooperation in the prevention area. Conflict prevention remains the cost effective tool, but the least understood. It is important to adopt a conflict prevention framework, which calls on Member States to engage in a problem and conflict-solving approach, with the Commission to enhance its support to identify vulnerabilities to conflict at the very early stage and on this basis, work out a mitigation strategy. With the support of the AUC, Ghana has finalised its report, the first country to volunteer for such exercise. I believe that the method could be proposed in addition to support the African Peace and Security Architecture and the AU Peace and Security Commission (Albin E. F. Ngounou, last December).&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;2) Second, there is a need to shift from the current top-down approach to a more people-centred mandate with a specific focus on peace desks, especially for women and youth. This would particularly incorporating local perspectives and improving the regional dimension of conflict at the AU level. The AUC needs to mainstream this dimension in its work and support the AU Commission on Peace and Security (ACP) in the same direction.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;3) Third, the importance of establishing a closer cooperation and working relationship among various regional and international actors cannot be overemphasised. In this context, given that Africa remains the major regional focus of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the partnership between the UN and the African Union (AU) is crucial. The notion in PBC and AU to further have such a mechanism should be built on the current AUC-UN MoU for Peacebuilding Support Offices, provide a solid foundation to strengthen cooperation in support of peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts, especially in Africa. We believe that we should further promote our partnership in this area, as outlined in our recent report on &quot;Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace.&quot;&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;4) Fourth, throughout the sustaining peace process, our collaborative endeavors will amount to little, if there is no corresponding effort to mobilise adequate resources for the implementation of the desired priorities. No significant progress can be made without adequate political will and technical and financial assistance to support concerned countries sustaining peace.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Statement by Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations</td>
<td>High-level Jamming on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>24 April 2018</td>
<td>&quot;In addressing the complexity of modern conflicts, we must recognize the importance of conflict prevention, early warning and preparedness, undertaking preventive measures to manage conflicts once they erupted. Therefore, understanding the concept of conflict-free peace, encompassing all cycles of conflict, is a key to long-term, stable and durable peace.&quot;</td>
<td>1. National ownership 2. Community ethics and solidarity 3. Promotion of national and international development goals 4. Internal and external development goals 5. National and international development goals 6. Capacity development.</td>
<td><a href="http://statements.un">http://statements.un</a>...</td>
<td>1) A pesar de una tradición centenaria, somos conscientes que la paz nunca debe alimentarse, preservado y compartido desde una perspectiva poliédrica y holística.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>Statement by Deputy Permanent Representative of Andorra to the United Nations</td>
<td>Récital de Altos Niveles sobre Conciliación de los Estados y en el Reino de Andorra</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>24-25 April 2018</td>
<td>&quot;Continuing our idea of peace and justice, we support a global approach for the resolution of conflicts that defend the rights of people, women and children, it should not be necessary for the resolution of conflicts, and at the same time, it is a preservation of the respect for human rights and the rule of law. We believe that the key to peace is education, based on the values of justice, and the prevention of conflict in its various forms and expressions, it is necessary to ensure that peace conditions are not only improved, but maintained in situations that are sensitive to the rule of law and human rights.&quot;</td>
<td>1. National ownership and independent&lt;br&gt;2. Community ethics and solidarity&lt;br&gt;3. Promotion of national and&lt;br&gt;international development&lt;br&gt;goals.</td>
<td><a href="http://statements.un">http://statements.un</a>...</td>
<td>1) A pesar de una tradición de desarrollo de una cultura que promueve la paz y la convivencia, es importante recordar que la Paz no es un fin en sí misma, sino un proceso constante de construcción. La Paz debe ser entendida como un proceso en el que se involucran todas las partes para construir una sociedad más justa, respetuosa y democrática.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Angola

Statement Delivered by Minister Counselor and Senior Political Officer, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations

Panel discussion on the theme of “The United Nations and Sustainable Peace” in the context of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals

1. I will start by echoing a sentiment expressed in the Security Council by the Deputy Secretary General on 25 August 2016. In debating “PBC: Peacebuilding and Sustainable Peace”, the General Assembly and the Security Council are currently engaged in an agenda-setting exercise to bring focus on the prevention of crises, peacebuilding and the protection of human rights and development. It is an exercise that underpins our understanding of the interactions between these fields, prioritizing political solutions and prevention, and leveraging the UN’s three pillars: peace and security, human rights and development - in a mutually reinforcing way. As the coordinator of the Working Group, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created this page to make the initiative available to the public, as well as to receive comments and suggestions, with a view to ensuring a transparent, inclusive, participatory NAP formulation and implementation process.

1. National ownership and independent action; internationally agreed development goals; national development priorities, both in the context of the event against the backdrop of the sustainable development goals.

https://statements.un.org/en/meetings/100589/002-
1ipdf

2) Furthermore, a special account separate from the regular budget should be established for special political missions, in line with the report of the Highlevel Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95- S/2015/446).

Burundi

Speech by the Ambassador, Representative for the United Nations

Afrique de l’Est en vue de la promotion de la paix en centrale Afrique, et dans le cadre de l’année internationale de la promotion du dialogue et de la résolution pacifique des conflits.

1. Even though the term “sustaining peace” has been much scrutinized, the Charter of the United Nations already incorporated the idea of preventive action, both at the international and national levels, as well as the need for partnerships, networks and alliances, among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations promote an agent for the pursuit of peace, security and development, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.

1) A multi-stakeholder approach.

2) A multi-stakeholder approach to the implementation of the New Agenda on the Prevention of Conflict. The regional and international instruments and mechanisms to prevent conflicts.

1. The Council should also focus on the peace impacts of a wider integrated strategy of peace funds, programmes and international financial instruments, as well as the need to prioritize prevention and prevent conflicts.

www.karuma.gov.burundi/sites/defaul-
templates/73_juy_en.pdf

2. Internationally agreed development goals.

3) In order to address increasing uncertainty and the collapse of existing systems, more inclusive and collaborative responses are urgently needed.

3) In order to address increasing uncertainty and the collapse of existing systems, more inclusive and collaborative responses are urgently needed.

3. Demobilization.

1. The working Group (WG) requires little for drafting, the Burundian NAP must be consistent with the requirements of the UN.”

3. The Working Group (WG) requires little for drafting, the Burundian NAP must be consistent with the requirements of the UN.”

Statement by the Prime Minister

Special Coordinator, Commission (Fourth Committee) Summary meeting A/75/C.2/L.16

1) Promoting development is a vital tool for the achievement of the Secretary-General’s aim for a culture of prevention. Therefore, Brazil supports the adoption of peacebuilding measures as a country emerging from armed conflict.

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1. Brazil adopts the 2019 Regional Conference Women held in Belo Horizonte (Brazil), which recognized women’s significant contributions linked to the advancement of women, who are a fund of knowledge and leadership, conflict resolution and promotion of peace at all levels.

www.karuma.gov.burundi/sites/default/files/1-
3l5_karuma_diasophasarathe-020319.pdf

1. The Working Group (WG) requires little for drafting, the Burundian NAP must be consistent with the requirements of the UN.”

3. The Working Group (WG) requires little for drafting, the Burundian NAP must be consistent with the requirements of the UN.”

www.karuma.gov.burundi/sites/default/files/1-
3l5_karuma_diasophasarathe-020319.pdf

4. “Promoting development is a tool for achieving the achievement of the Secretary-General’s aim for a culture of prevention. Therefore, Brazil supports the adoption of peacebuilding measures.”

1. Promoting development is a tool for achieving the achievement of the Secretary-General’s aim for a culture of prevention. Therefore, Brazil supports the adoption of peacebuilding measures.

https://mali.undp.org/local/ka-
13644930f/13644930f.pdf

2. The central role of women and youths in peacebuilding and peace and security, human rights and sustainable development, and in this connection, the fundamental role of women and girls in peace and security, the environment, economic inequalities and development in order to enhance the global peace to be cornerstone of the global peace.

Burkina Faso

Speech by the Ambassador, Representative for the United Nations

Déclaration de la République du Burkina Faso au Haut-niveau sur la consolidation et de la perennisation de la paix, en canalisant et en alignant les ressources sur les strategies nationales et régionales.

1. We should be all committed to demonstrate our resolve to focus on political and preventive actions.

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Brazil

Statement by the President of Brazil

"Dialogue and solidarity are the ways to overcome interference and block the ignorance and conflicts...We applaud and encourages peacebuilding and negotiation, which is essential for the development of all..."https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/ga辩论/2018-09/s1359296.pdf

1. Common objectives and solidarity
2. Multi-lateralism and cooperation
3. National well-being

Key Ideas Website

Actionable Proposals

China

Speech by the President of the People’s Republic of China

"Dialogue and solidarity are the way to...1. Common objectives and solidarity
2. Equality (horizontality)

Key Ideas Website

Actionable Proposals

Colombia

Statement by the President of the Republic

The Colombian Government has a firm...firmly believe that the way to peace..."https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/ga辩论/2018-09/s1359296.pdf

1. National well-being and development
2. National well-being and development
3. National well-being and development

Key Ideas Website

Actionable Proposals

El Salvador

Statement by the President of El Salvador


1. Respect for national sovereignty
2. National ownership and independence
3. Non-interference in domestic affairs
4. International legal cooperation

Key Ideas Website

Actionable Proposals

Statement by Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs


1. Enhance political will.
2. Strengthen support for political will.
3. Sack up financial support.

Key Ideas Website

Actionable Proposals

Statement by Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs


1. Mutual trust.
3. Mutual integrity and justice.
4. Reform and innovation of security governance system.
5. Sustainable development.

Key Ideas Website

Actionable Proposals

Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs


1. Promotion of national and collective sovereignty
2. Respect for national sovereignty
3. Complex objectives and solidarity
4. National ownership and independence
5. Equality (horizontality)

Key Ideas Website

Actionable Proposals

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Key Ideas Website

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Key Ideas Website

Actionable Proposals
The Meeting on The Meeting on The Meeting on The Meeting on

**Key Ideas**
- The concept of sustainable development: a holistic development strategy
- The importance of institutional cooperation and coordination
- The need for international cooperation and policy coherence
- The role of science and technology in sustainable development

**Website**

**Actionable Proposals**
1. Promote international cooperation and coordination in the implementation of the SDGs
2. Strengthen national capacities and institutional frameworks
3. Enhance partnerships and public-private cooperation
4. Strengthen the role of science and technology in sustainable development
The Closing

Country,

Territory or

Title

1. Common objectives

“Document

Gulf

and solidarity

Highnesses and Excellencies, the Ministers of Justice. These recommendations

are aimed at strengthening the joint cooperation process in the field of justice.

2) The Supreme Council perused the follow-up report on education and

3) The Supreme Council deliberated on the global environmental situation,

2) The Supreme Council called on the

1) We would specifically like to share our experience in economic areas like

2) No one organ alone can promote peacebuilding, sustaining peace, or the 2030

3) They endorsed connectivity as a key priority area of cooperation, together

4) They ensured support to and facilitation of further relevant cooperation

5) They recommended that its governments take further strong measures and practical

6) New cooperation on the protection of children, especially girls and women, has emerged as a top

9. Internationally agreed

development goals.


3) They endorsed connectivity as a key priority area of cooperation, together

5) They recommended that its governments take further strong measures and practical

6) New cooperation on the protection of children, especially girls and women, has emerged as a top

9. Internationally agreed development goals.
Mercosur

Country, Territory or Organization: Mercosur

Document Type: Declaration

Title: Declaration of Heads of State and Government on the Humanitarian Situation in Venezuela

City: New York

Date: 25 September 2018

https://gadebate.un.org/docs/AG/RES.73/243

1. The member states emphasize the importance of fostering peace, restoring a climate of peaceful coexistence, respecting democratic institutions and guaranteeing the right of peoples to determine their own future.

2) They also encourage the establishment of a mechanism for the exchange of information on the situation of Venezuela and the development of multilateral cooperation and measures to bring about a lasting peace and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to promote the full and effective implementation of the documents and agreements that have been signed by the parties.

Namibia

Statement by the President of Namibia

The 73rd General Assembly of the United Nations

New York

24-25 April 2018

"Namibians are determined to implement a policy of reconciliation, a policy that has not been without its challenges, but which we are committed to, for the benefit of our people together. It is the result of the national will and values of the Namibian people, and its commitment to promoting national self-reliance.

The 74th General Assembly of the United Nations

New York

September 2019

1. The only global institutional framework in place to address these challenges is the United Nations, which continues to find ways to support countries in their efforts to promote peace, stability, and development.

2) The declaration on the role of the United Nations in supporting countries in the implementation of their development priorities at the request of developing countries, as well as the UN’s increasing emphasis on evidence-based decision-making, is welcomed by the new Government of Namibia.

GS5

Group of 5

The 70th Report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council of the Group of 5

Sao Paulo

January 2018

The Peace Agreement has served to create favorable conditions for the development of justice and peace in several countries in the region, which facilitates the opening of dialogue channels for the conclusion of agreements that can contribute to the progress of the countries involved.

The OIC - 2nd Ministerial Conference on Countering Terrorism

Jeddah

May 2019

The OIC - 22nd Extraordinary Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers

Jeddah

November 2019

The OIC - 23rd Ordinary Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers

Jeddah

November 2019

The OIC - 24th Session

Jeddah

November 2019

Organization of Islamic Cooperation

The OIC - 26th Session

Jeddah

November 2021

The OIC - 27th Session

Jeddah

November 2022

The OIC - 28th Session

Jeddah

November 2023

The OIC - 29th Session

Jeddah

November 2024

The OIC - 30th Session

Jeddah

November 2025

The OIC - 31st Session

Jeddah

November 2026

The OIC - 32nd Session

Jeddah

November 2027

The OIC - 33rd Session

Jeddah

November 2028

The OIC - 34th Session

Jeddah

November 2029

The OIC - 35th Session

Jeddah

November 2030

The OIC - 36th Session

Jeddah

November 2031

The OIC - 37th Session

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November 2032

The OIC - 38th Session

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November 2033

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The OIC - 41st Session

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November 2095

The OIC - 101st Session

Jeddah

November 2096

The OIC - 102nd Session

Jeddah

November 2097

The OIC - 103rd Session

Jeddah

November 2098

The OIC - 104th Session

Jeddah

November 2099

The OIC - 105th Session

Jeddah

November 2000
Peace Organization

1. Common objectives
2. Mutual solidarity
3. Dialogue and collective action
4. National ownership
5. National ownership
6. International agreed development goals
7. Capacity development

1. Respect for national sovereignty
2. National ownership
3. Respect for national sovereignty
4. International agreed development goals
5. Inter-connectedness

1. National ownership
2. National ownership
3. Non-interference in domestic affairs
4. International agreed development goals
5. Alignment to national priorities at the outset and at all stages of conflict.

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5. Alignment to national priorities at the outset and at all stages of conflict.
**Country or Territory of Publication**: Serbia  
**Organization**: Key Ideas Website  
**Website**: meetings.org/me-

### 1. National ownership

- High-Level representatives and stakeholders in Serbia underscore the importance of national ownership in peacebuilding and sustaining peace. This approach emphasizes the role of the Republic of Serbia in the framework of the UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) and the International Community in the area of peacebuilding and reconciliation.

- The meeting's discussion highlights the need for a coordinated approach between the government and international partners to address challenges such as food and water shortages and the eradication of food insecurity. It also stresses the importance of combating Inequalities to achieve social and economic development and respect for human rights. The commitment to address these issues is seen as a promise of the Agenda 2030, which seeks to advance gender equality and end violence against women and girls.

### 2. Common objectives

- The meeting's participants stress the importance of counteracting modern threats to international security based on the generally accepted norms of international law and international treaties accepted by the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization). This includes working expert groups for judicial expert activities and for legal services of the SCO.

- The ministers of (law and) justice of the SCO have noted the need to promote the governance reforms and development of South Africa. They highlighted the importance of South Africa's engagement in the context of the African Solidarity Initiative, which aims to provide 'in kind' support such as training and capacity building of state institutions. This is seen as a long-term strategy to support the SC member states in enhancing their capacity for conflict prevention, protection concerns, and development of these countries.

- The meeting's participants acknowledged the need for a strong and effective role of the UN Security Council, especially in the context of sexual violence in conflict prevention, protection, and participation in the peace-building and reconciliation process. They also emphasized the importance of giving strong consideration to addressing the protection concerns, including the reporting of instances of sexual abuse and exploitation.

- The participants considered the role of the Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace, and Security as a tool for the UN General Assembly to adopt the African Women's Agenda, ensuring sustainable economic opportunities, employment, education, and health care, which are all essential components of an inclusive, open, and peaceful society.

### 3. Common objectives

- The ministers of (law and) justice have taken note of Russia’s report regarding the SCO Charter, the Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation of the SCO Member States, and the SCO Development Strategy Towards 2025. They have expressed support for the development and further improvement of interaction between the ministries and agencies of (law and) justice.

- The meeting's participants agreed on the need to strengthen the governance reforms and development of South Africa. They acknowledged the importance of South Africa's engagement in the context of the African Solidarity Initiative, which aims to provide 'in kind' support such as training and capacity building of state institutions. This is seen as a long-term strategy to support the SC member states in enhancing their capacity for conflict prevention, protection concerns, and development of these countries.

- The participants considered the role of the Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace, and Security as a tool for the UN General Assembly to adopt the African Women's Agenda, ensuring sustainable economic opportunities, employment, education, and health care, which are all essential components of an inclusive, open, and peaceful society.

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- The participants emphasized the need for the Security Council to give strong consideration to addressing the protection concerns, including the reporting of instances of sexual abuse and exploitation, and the need to encourage the Security Council to give strong consideration to addressing the protection concerns, including the reporting of instances of sexual abuse and exploitation.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, Territory or Organization</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>(Sustaining) Peace</th>
<th>Key Ideas</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Actionable Proposals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Africa</strong></td>
<td>Statement by the Counsellor (Political) of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations</td>
<td>The Open Debate on Maintenence of International Peace and Security: Mediation and peaceful evolution of conflicts</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>29 August 2018</td>
<td>“The idea of peacebuilding is strongly based on the understanding that peace cannot exist without development, and development cannot thrive without peace and stability. This is why under the UN Charter’s approach to peace and security, the maintenance of international peace and security is strongly dependent on a prosperous and peaceful Africa.”</td>
<td>1. A multi-stakeholder approach 2. Central role of women in conflict resolution and economic revitalization</td>
<td><a href="http://www.southafrica-new-york.net/pmun/state-memts%202018/security_%20council_maintenance_of_international_peace_and_security_20180829.html">www.southafrica-new-york.net/pmun/state-memts%202018/security_%20council_maintenance_of_international_peace_and_security_20180829.html</a></td>
<td>1) My delegation emphasizes that the Security Council should continue to support regional mechanisms, including the AU Peace and Security Council, and prioritize consultations with local mediators in specific conflict areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trinidad and Tobago</strong></td>
<td>Statement by the Ambassador/Permanent Representative to the United Nations</td>
<td>High-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>25 April 2018</td>
<td>“Trinidad and Tobago concurs that significant linkages between financing for peacebuilding and development are important in achieving sustainable peace and development. Its delegation encourages the development of innovative mechanisms, which would go far in assisting countries to access financing for peacebuilding, and development.”</td>
<td>1. National ownership and independence 2. Common objectives and solidarity 3. A multi-stakeholder approach 4. National well-being 5. Promotion of national and collective self-reliance 6. Internationally agreed development goals 7. Alignment to national development priorities at the request of developing countries 8. Capacity development.</td>
<td><a href="http://statements.un-meetings.org/me-dbx/18559525/trinidad-and-tobago.pdf">http://statements.un-meetings.org/me-dbx/18559525/trinidad-and-tobago.pdf</a></td>
<td>1) For small states such as Trinidad and Tobago and indeed Member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the maintenance of international peace and security, including peacebuilding and sustaining peace, are of particular importance. We are intensely aware of our sustainable development, which is intrinsically linked to the safety and security of our people. 2) Trinidad and Tobago is located in a region that is not affected by armed conflict, but by armed violence. Transnational organized crime and its global networks pose a daunting challenge to the security of all States, but especially Small Island Developing States. 3) Lasting peace can only be achieved if women are more involved in decision-making processes relating to peace-building and post-conflict development. Therefore, in recognition of the important contribution of women to peace and development, Trinidad and Tobago introduced – and has been the main sponsor since 2010 – of United Nations General Assembly Resolution on ‘Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control’.</td>
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ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
THE CASE FOR SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
THE CASE FOR

UN Photo by Martine Perret.
Fisherman Casts Net.